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Federalism and the Military Power of
the United States
Robert Leider*
This Article examines the original meaning of the constitutional
provisions governing the raising and organization of military forces. It argues
that the Framers carefully divided the military between the federal and state
governments. This division provided structural checks against the misuse of
military power and made it more difficult to use offensive military force. These
structural checks have been compromised by the creation of the U.S. Army
Reserve, the dual enlistment of National Guard officers and soldiers, and the
acceptance of conscription into the national army, all of which have enhanced
federal military power beyond its original constitutional limits.
This Article then explains the relevance of deviations from original
constitutional design for contemporary legal disputes. Most significantly,
although the expansion of federal military power has largely come at state
expense, this expansion has also disturbed the allocation of war powers between
Congress and the president. In addition, understanding the original division of
military power is relevant to determining modern limits on Congress’s power to
raise and regulate the armed forces, including its power to impose military
criminal jurisdiction on reserve soldiers.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “raise and
support Armies” and to “provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia.”1 Congress has broader power over the armies
of the United States than it has over the militia.2 For over a century,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress’s Army Power is plenary and
1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 16.
2.
The Constitution limits Congress’s power to call forth the militia into the service of the
United States to three cases: executing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling
invasions. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Federal power over the militia is additionally limited by the
provision that states appoint the officers, conduct the training, and govern the militia when it is
not in the service of the United States. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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unrestrained by the limitations in the Militia Clauses;3 that all (or
nearly all) members of the organized militia—including its officer
corps—can be required to join the national army;4 and that if Congress
wants to evade the limitations of the Militia Clauses, Congress can
deem militiamen to be army soldiers, thereby allowing Congress to
exercise the same plenary authority over militiamen that it exercises
over regular soldiers of the United States. This expansive federal
power, the Court has said, “recognizes the supremacy of federal power
in the area of military affairs.”5
This Article challenges that account. The Constitution divided
military power not only horizontally between Congress and the
president but also vertically between the federal government and the
states. The Framers placed three critical limits in the Constitution.
First, they separated the “Armies” from the “Militia.”6 Second, the
Framers placed restrictions on the federal government’s use of the
militia.7 Third, the Framers insulated the militia officer corps from
direct federal supervision in peacetime by allowing states to select the
officers.8
This Article argues that the federal government has undermined
these three original structural limitations. First, Congress has evaded
the limitations on its power over the militia through the creation of the
U.S. Army Reserve. The U.S. Army Reserve is a wholly national militia
that is accessible to the federal government outside of the three
purposes enumerated by the Militia Clauses. Second, Congress has
expanded its authority over the organized militia by requiring members
of the National Guard to enroll in both the federal military reserve and
the militia. This “dual enlistment” system has allowed Congress to
exercise its plenary Army Power over the organized militia. And it has
subverted the independence of militia officers from the federal
3.
See Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 382 (1918)
(distinguishing the “constitutional provisions concerning the militia [from] that conferring upon
Congress the power to raise armies” and noting that Congress retains “complete authority”
regarding “[t]he army sphere”).
4.
See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 347 (1990) (noting that “every member of the
Minnesota National Guard has voluntarily enlisted, or accepted a commission as an officer, in the
National Guard of the United States and [has] thereby become a member of the Reserve Corps of
the Army”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012) (defining the “organized militia” as the “National
Guard” and the “Naval Militia”); 10 U.S.C. § 8904 (2012) (requiring ninety-five percent of naval
militia members to be members of the U.S. Navy Reserve or U.S. Marine Corps Reserve to receive
federal support).
5.
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351.
6.
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing an exclusively federal army), with id.
art I, § 8, cl. 16 (keeping the militia attached to the states).
7.
Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16.
8.
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 16.
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government because states must discharge National Guard officers who
lose their federal recognition. Finally, Congress has collapsed the
distinction between the militia and the army by allowing the federal
government to conscript all able-bodied citizens into the national army.
Through its power to raise armies,9 the federal government may now
swallow the entire militia.
After explaining how the federal government has assumed
military power originally reserved to the states, this Article explains
why the federal takeover of the militia matters for a variety of
contemporary legal disputes. Far from being distinct spheres, the
division of power horizontally through separation of powers and
vertically through federalism are intertwined. Most seriously, the
federal government’s usurpation of state military power has
destabilized the original horizontal division of military power between
the president and Congress. The creation of a large military reserve
force—an exclusively national militia in all but name—has
substantially broadened presidential power to initiate and conduct
hostilities without Congress’s ex ante consent.
Finally, this Article argues for some new modern limits on
Congress’s power to raise and govern the armed forces based on the
original understanding of the Militia Clauses. First, the Supreme Court
should recognize new limits on Congress’s power to conscript. Even
assuming, arguendo, that Congress has some power of conscription into
the federal army, Congress undoubtedly lacks the power to conscript
citizens into federal military reserve forces. A military body comprised
of conscripted citizens serving in part-time units constitutes a militia
and thus must be organized pursuant to the Militia Clauses. Second,
Congress should not be able to apply universal military criminal
jurisdiction to reserve members of the army.10 Constitutionally, parttime citizen-soldiers are members of the militia, not the army.
Consequently, they should not be subject to military law except “when
in actual service in time of War or public danger.”11
This Article will have four parts. Part I explicates the general
division of power between federal and state governments and shows
9.
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 12.
10. The arguments in this Article would likely apply to the Air Force because the Air Force
is part of the constitutional “Armies” of the United States. See 10 U.S.C. § 7001 (2012) (defining
“Army” as “the Army or Armies referred to in the Constitution of the United States, less that part
established by law as the Air Force”). The arguments would likely not apply to the naval reserve.
Congress may have broader power to create and govern part-time naval forces. See infra note 56
(arguing that the “naval militia” is not part of the constitutional militia); cf. note 344 and
accompanying text (suggesting that, even if conscription into the army is unconstitutional,
Congress may have the power to conscript sailors).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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how the Framers provided for partially decentralized armed forces. As
they did with other governmental powers, the Framers paid careful
attention to ensuring the existence of adequate checks and balances for
military power. By dividing authority between the federal and state
governments, the Framers hoped to create adequate fighting forces that
the United States and the states could use for self-defense and law
enforcement—while protecting the populace from oppression by either
state or federal officials.
In Part II, I argue that Congress lacks the power to create an
army reserve. Federal law currently requires all federally funded,
organized militia members to simultaneously enroll in the National
Guard of a state, which is the organized militia of that state, and in the
“National Guard of the United States,” which is a reserve component of
the armed forces.12 The Supreme Court unanimously assumed the
validity of this arrangement in Perpich v. Department of Defense,13 a
case that, although not formally upholding dual enlistment, leaves little
doubt that the Supreme Court accepted its constitutionality. Dual
enlistment, however, is unconstitutional. The U.S. Army Reserve is an
organized militia. It is not part of the “armies” described in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 12, which referred to land forces comprising regular
troops. Because the U.S. Army Reserve is a militia, it is subject to the
constitutional constraints imposed by the Militia Clauses, including
restrictions against the federal government calling forth the militia and
the requirement that states appoint the officers.14 Congress cannot
evade these limitations simply by labeling the force the “U.S. Army
Reserve.” Correlatively, Congress cannot evade the limitations on
federal use of the militia by having National Guardsmen
simultaneously enlist in both the militia and the U.S. Army Reserve.
Third, I argue that, a fortiori, Congress cannot constitutionally require
militia officers to enroll in the U.S. Army Reserve. The Framers
intended that officers of the militia would constitute a separate chain
of command, one not under federal control except when in the actual
service of the United States. By requiring officers of the militia to enroll
in the federal army, Congress has subverted this structural limitation.
In Part III, I explain why Congress likely lacks a power of
conscription, which the Supreme Court first upheld in the Selective
12. For laws governing enlisted personnel in this regard, see 32 U.S.C. §§ 301, 322 (2012).
For those governing officers in this regard, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 12211, 12212 (2012); 32 U.S.C. § 324
(2012).
13. See 496 U.S. 334, 350 (1990) (“Over the years, Congress has exercised this power in
various ways, but its current choice of a dual enlistment system is just as permissible as the 1792
choice to have the members of the militia arm themselves.”).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16.
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Draft Law Cases.15 My argument is structural. The Constitution
restricted the federal government’s ability to call forth the militia to
three activities: executing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and
repelling invasions. After the Selective Draft Law Cases, however, these
checks became mostly meaningless because the federal government
could label the militia as an “army” and then exercise plenary control.16
My argument is that Congress cannot evade the limitations on its
Militia Power simply by relabeling the militia as an army. This Part
also argues that, even assuming Congress has some power of
conscription, Congress lacks the power to draft soldiers into a federal
reserve army. Shortly after the Framing, Congress debated what
distinguished a “militia” from an army. Some argued that a militia was
conscripted, while an army comprised volunteers; others argued that a
militia comprised part-time citizen-soldiers while an army comprised
regular soldiers.17 Under either approach, a conscripted, part-time
fighting force is a “militia.”
Part IV addresses the broader implications for the destruction of
federalism-based checks on contemporary disputes. This Part examines
how the destruction of military federalism affects federal-state
relations, separation of powers, and the constitutional limits of federal
military criminal jurisdiction. Its primary theme is that originalists
must engage in a “second-best originalism” in response to pervasive
deviations from original constitutional design. For example, the
destruction of federalism-based checks has enlarged the power of the
president well beyond what the Framers intended and diminished the
power of Congress. Originalists who call for a robust, preclusive
Commander-in-Chief Power need to account for how deviations from
military federalism have enhanced the president’s unilateral power. On
this view, laws such as the War Powers Act may help rebalance
horizontal separation of powers in line with the Framers’ original
intent. Originalists will also need to engage in second-best originalism
when examining the constitutional limits of military criminal
jurisdiction over reservists, whom the Framers would have classified as
militiamen rather than as regular soldiers.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF MILITARY POWER
The Constitution splits power based on three principles. The
first is separation of powers, which is the formal separation of
15. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
16. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347–48.
17. See infra notes 361–375.
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legislative, executive, and judicial power into separate governmental
departments.18 The second is checks and balances, which use the partial
“intermingling of functions in order to permit the branches to provide a
check on their counterparts.”19 And the third is federalism, which is
based on “the unique insight that freedom is enhanced by the creation
of two governments, not one.”20
The Constitution divides the military power along all three lines.
Horizontally, the Framers divided power over the military between
Congress and the president, both separating functions and providing
checks. For example, the Constitution gave Congress the powers to
raise armies, provide for a navy, organize the militia, declare war,
regulate the armed forces, and tax and appropriate money for military
affairs.21 The president was made commander in chief of the military
and had the power to appoint the officers with the Senate’s consent.22
Less appreciated, however, is that federalizing the military was
another way in which the Framers divided the military power.23 The
vertical division of military power resulted from conflict and
compromise about what kind of forces the country should rely on for
national defense. In principle, most Framers preferred maintaining a
militia over having a standing army. The Framers were concerned that
professional soldiers could become tools of governmental oppression,
and prevailing republican sentiment disfavored the maintenance of
standing armies in times of peace. But the Framers also recognized that
standing armies were more practical for national defense. Citizensoldiers were often more citizen than soldier. The lack of preparation,
discipline, and coordination among American forces during the
Revolutionary War had nearly led to defeat against the British
regulars.
The compromises over the Constitution’s military clauses derive
from the Framers’ desire to gain the benefits of having both professional
soldiers and an armed citizenry—that is, to have a strong national
defense without risking national oppression. To do this, the
Constitution created two interoperable—but partially separate—
military structures: first, full-time professional servicemen under
plenary federal control; and second, citizen-soldiers who would be
18. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1522–24 (1991).
19. Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in Criminal Law, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 19) (on file with author).
20. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11–14, 16.
22. Id. art. II, § 2.
23. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1496 (1987).
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organized into a hybrid national-state militia system. The Framers
then used the partial separation of these forces both to limit federal
military power and to provide checks against the use of illegitimate
force by private parties, state actors, and federal officials.
This Part has four sections. Section A will examine the decision
to grant Congress plenary authority to raise a professional military.
Sections B and C will examine the militia. Section B will describe the
federal character24 of the militia system and argue that the Framers
mostly nationalized the militia. Section C will explain some of the
practical legal implications of the militia’s federal character. Finally,
Section D will explain how the Framers intended the division of
authority over the professional military and the militia to contribute to
a system of military checks and balances.
A. Professional Forces
The Framing generation generally opposed maintaining fulltime professional soldiers, especially in peacetime. In part, these
objections were philosophical. Many thought the profession of arms was
incompatible with republican civic virtue.25 Professional soldiers make
it their career to become proficient in the skill of killing other human
beings.26 Professional soldiers also could not be trusted to preserve free
government.27 Regular soldiers were subject to constant military
discipline and were thereby removed from the freedoms enjoyed by the
republican political community that they were defending.28 Worse,
24. By “federal character” I mean that the federal and state governments share authority
over the militia. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244–46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (distinguishing “national character” from “federal character”). When I use this phrase,
I do not mean that the militia is a military force belonging to the federal government alone.
25. CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR 354–56 (1979) (noting the belief
that officers could be “trained to monarchy by military habits”).
26. Cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413–14 (noting that even troops’
entertainment is hunting because it resembles killing).
27. See Massachusetts Convention Debates (February 1, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1390, 1396, 1399–1400 (John P. Kaminski et
al. eds., 2000) (statement of Nasson in Massachusetts ratifying convention) (describing standing
armies as the “bane of republican governments”); Albany Antifederal Committee, N.Y.J., Apr. 26,
1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 337, 337 (David E. Young ed., 1991)
(objecting against “[t]he power to raise, support, and maintain a standing army in time of peace”
as “[t]he bane of a republican government” in that standing armies have reduced “most of the once
free nations of the globe . . . to bondage”); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE
STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 20–21 (1964) (noting that officers
prior to 1800 generally were mercenaries, who viewed officership as a business rather than a
profession and who judged success by monetary standards).
28. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *416–17 (“These men . . . seeing the liberty
which others possess, and which they themselves are excluded from, are apt . . . to live in a state
of perpetual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community . . . .”).
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armies were often composed of unsavory characters, sometimes
impressed into service.29 For these reasons, the Framing generation
viewed professional soldiers as unreliable guardians of free
government.30 The Framers also had practical objections to having a
standing army. Professional soldiers are maintained at public expense,
and paying and equipping regular troops is burdensome.31
The Framing generation’s objections to standing armies largely
derived from over a century of conflict. In the seventeenth century,
English monarchs had used the army and other volunteer forces, which
belonged solely to the Crown, to attack Parliament and religious and
political opponents.32 As Frederic Maitland explains, “England came
under the domination of the army” during the English Civil Wars.33
Following those conflicts, King Charles II formed a select militia, and
many feared that he would disband Parliament and rule using the
army.34 These actions, and others, led to popular hatred of standing

29. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 53 (1998)
(“These men, full-time soldiers who had sold themselves into virtual bondage to the government,
were typically considered the dregs of society—men without land, homes, families, or principles.”);
CORRELLI BARNETT, BRITAIN AND HER ARMY 1509–1970: A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SURVEY 41–42 (1970) (describing an impressment system that generally caused drunks, criminals,
and the idle to be enlisted into the professional army).
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299 (James Madison) (discussing how many
regular soldiers can be raised by a populace); 3 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 50 (P.F.
Collier & Son 1909) (1776) (discussing how countries “pay[ ] the expense of [these soldiers’] service”
and how this is financially burdensome).
32. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 29, at 73–78 (recounting the history of King Charles I’s
power struggles with Parliament between 1639 and 1642); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 326 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1908) (describing fears that King
Charles I would overthrow Parliament using the standing army).
33. MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 326.
34. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT 63 (1994) (discussing the formation of the “select militia” and the articles of
impeachment against Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, who was accused of telling the king to
effectively replace Parliament with a standing army). A “select militia” is the older terminology for
“organized militia.” Like today’s “organized militia” (e.g., the National Guard), the select militia
was a subset of the entire political community capable of bearing arms. Often this subset
voluntarily enlisted, though occasionally it was drafted by lots. See generally BARNETT, supra note
29, at 34 (discussing the formation of “trained bands” in England); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26,
at *412 (describing the system of organizing part of the militia with organized militiamen chosen
by lots).
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armies and select militias among England’s political elite.35 The
American Founding generation shared that distrust.36
Yet, the opposition to a professional military was not absolute.
Virtually all the Framers recognized the need to have some regular
soldiers.37 The United States had frontiers to protect and garrisons to
guard, which required at least a small, but constant, military presence
in times of peace.38 The country also needed a navy.39 And a state-based
militia system created several practical problems, including states
improperly training and supervising their militias and state
governments unwilling to send militias to suppress insurrections.40
Thus, while many in principle preferred the militia to the army, the

35. See MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 326 (“At the Restoration the very name of a standing
army had become hateful to the classes which were to be the ruling classes.”); Russell F. Weigley,
The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,
in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 215, 219
(Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) (“In reaction to Cromwell and the Stuarts,
however, there emerged an English national tradition of suspicion of the military as an intrinsic
threat to civilian self-government and liberties.”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 592–93 (2008) (noting that King Charles II’s “order[ing] [of] general disarmaments of regions
home to his Protestant enemies” made the English “extremely wary of concentrated military forces
run by the state and . . . jealous of their arms”).
36. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–99 (“During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the
Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or
select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.”); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154,
156–57 (1840) (recounting the English history as providing the primary impetus for preferring
armed citizens for collective defense); Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV.
29, 73 (2005) (“To many observers, the British regulars who arrived in Boston in October 1768 to
enforce the Townshend duties signified the danger of a military no longer under the control of the
people. . . . By the fall of 1774, opposition to professional soldiering had reached national
proportions.”); Weigley, supra note 35, at 219 (“The American colonists fully accepted the Whig
antimilitary tradition and indeed integrated it into American political culture.”).
37. See Mazzone, supra note 36, at 73 (“Eighteenth-century Americans were not opposed to
armies entirely, and the wisdom of professional military training was widely appreciated.”). Even
Elbridge Gerry and George Mason, who were so adamantly opposed to standing armies that they
refused to sign the Constitution in part for that reason, recognized the need for some troops. See,
e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 633 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS] (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (noting that the Constitution permitted the
federal government unlimited power to raise troops). Gerry unsuccessfully tried to limit the
number of troops maintained in time of peace to two or three thousand. 2 RECORDS, supra, at 329–
30. Mason understood the need for troops but wanted some declaration about the dangers of
standing armies. 2 RECORDS, supra, at 616–17. Charles Pinckney introduced language to prohibit
keeping troops in time of peace except with the legislature’s consent and limiting the
appropriations for “military land forces” for one year. See 2 RECORDS, supra, at 323, 329, 341.
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing both the
necessity of and the problem of manning the garrisons); HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 166–67.
39. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 450.
40. See id. at 330, 332 (statements of Charles Pinckney) (noting that the lack of militia
discipline caused problems both during the Revolutionary War and during Shay’s Rebellion); id.
at 387 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (observing that “the Militia were every where neglected
by the State Legislatures, the members of which courted popularity too much to enforce a proper
discipline”); id. (statement of James Madison) (“The States neglect their Militia now . . . .”).
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Framing generation still widely recognized (even if many begrudgingly
accepted) that having some professional soldiers was necessary for
national defense.
Not all Framers viewed a standing army as a necessary evil.
Some—most vocally Alexander Hamilton and George Washington—
accepted the legitimacy of professional soldiers. They recognized that
the art of war requires practice to achieve proficiency.41 And the militia
was unreliable. Ordinary citizens resented being pulled away from their
homes to train and fight, especially for long periods of time.42 Lacking
the virtues of good soldiers, ordinary citizens often acted incompetently
in battle.43 Hamilton further argued that, although a professional army
was costly to maintain, so too was a universal militia; equipping and
disciplining the entire able-bodied citizenry bore high actual and
opportunity costs.44
The Framers ultimately decided to substantially broaden
Congress’s military power. Under the Articles of Confederation, there
was “doubt . . . whether Cong[ress] . . . ha[d] a right to keep Ships or

41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 24, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“War, like
most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time,
and by practice.”); 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 56; Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14,
1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
27, at 1258, 1278–79 (statement of Nicholas) (questioning the adequacy of “men unacquainted with
the hardships, and unskilled in the discipline of war”); see also RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 74 (1967) (quoting George Washington as demonstration of his belief
“that the military experience of the Revolution proved America’s need for a professional army”).
42. See, e.g., Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1278–79
(statement of Nicholas); Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24,
1776), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 106, 110 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1932)
(describing relying on the militia as “resting upon a broken staff,” especially considering how it
consisted of “[m]en just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life”); see also 3 RECORDS,
supra note 37, at 172, 207–08 (statement of Luther Martin to the Maryland ratifying convention)
(explaining that he refused to sign the Constitution, among other things, because of the possible
burdens placed on militiamen and the refusal to limit the size of the standing army to what was
necessary).
43. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 24, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The
steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted
by a force of the same kind.”); 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 56; Debates of the Virginia Convention
(June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1278–79 (statement of Nicholas) (questioning whether the
country would be safe with solely a militia upon invasion and stating that the “inadequacy [of a
militia] is proved by the experience of other nations”); Letter from George Washington to the
President of Congress (Sept. 15, 1780), in 20 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note
42, at 49–50 (distinguishing the troops of a militia from those of an army); see also WEIGLEY, supra
note 41, at 74 (quoting George Washington as saying, “No Militia will ever acquire the habits
necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is
only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service”).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 182–83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To oblige the
great body of the yeomanry . . . to be under arms . . . . would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which . . . would not fall far short of the whole
expense of the civil establishments of all the States.”).
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troops in time of peace.”45 The Constitution settled this question in the
affirmative, granting Congress broad power to “raise and support
Armies”46 and to “provide and maintain a Navy.”47 Despite the Framing
generation’s consternations about standing armies, those in favor of a
broad military power defeated attempts during the Constitutional
Convention to limit the Army Power. These proposals included limiting
the number of troops that the federal government could raise and even
cautionary declarations about the dangers of standing armies.48 Later,
during discussion over the Bill of Rights, the Framers refused to adopt
proposals to require a supermajority of Congress before keeping
professional troops in time of peace.49 The only adopted limitation on
the Army Power was that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years,”50 which facilitated Congress
periodically debating whether to continue funding a standing army.
With less controversy, the Framers continued restrictions
against states having professional militaries. The Articles of
Confederation had prohibited states from maintaining “vessels of war”
or “any body of forces” in peacetime, with narrow defensive exceptions
that had to be approved by Congress.51 The states, however, did not
faithfully follow these prohibitions.52 At the Constitutional Convention,
the delegates reaffirmed the prohibition against professional soldiers
and sailors, with no serious debate about removing them. Hamilton
proposed early that “[n]o state [shall] have any forces land or Naval.”53
James Madison noted that an uneven distribution of military force
among the states could allow a minority of states with more military

45. 1 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 287.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
49. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780–81 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (1789) (rejecting a proposal to
add a two-thirds requirement for standing armies in times of peace to what is now the Second
Amendment); see also Maryland Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 729, 735 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (“That no standing army shall
be kept up in time of peace, unless with the consent of two thirds of the members present of each
branch of Congress.”); New Hampshire Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 758, 761 (proposing a requirement that three-fourths
of the legislature approve a peacetime army).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 505.
51. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 4. In contrast to its general
prohibitions against states maintaining professional land and naval forces, the Articles of
Confederation made states duty-bound to maintain their militia. Id.
52. 1 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 316 (complaining that Massachusetts had raised troops
without even notifying Congress).
53. Id. at 293.
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might to rule over the majority.54 After some minor stylistic revisions,55
this became a prohibition against states “keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace” without Congress’s consent.56
Thus, the first part of military federalism relates to the
professional military services. The Constitution grants near-plenary
control over the professional army and the navy to the federal
government. The federal government may raise armies and provide for
a navy. States, in contrast, are forbidden to do these things, except in
time of war or with Congress’s consent.
B. (Mostly) Nationalizing the Militia
This Section describes the constitutional organization of the
militia. Despite the ubiquity of referring to the militia as “the state
militia,” I argue that the Constitution transformed the American
militia system into a primarily national military auxiliary to the
professional forces. This national system, however, still contained some
important limitations on Congress’s power. I will argue in subsequent
Parts that Congress has improperly used its Army Power to subvert
these limitations.
The partial nationalization of the militia resulted from the
failure of a true state-based system under the Articles of Confederation.
The Articles left a critical gap between power and responsibility.57 The
Articles left the making of war to Congress,58 but Congress had to rely
on state militias as the peacetime national defense force.59 On paper,
the Articles of Confederation obliged states to maintain a wellregulated militia.60 In practice, however, the states neglected that

54. Id. at 318.
55. For proposals and variations on the final language, see 2 id. at 169, 577, 597, 626.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Beginning in 1891, Congress has provided funds “for naval
militia of various States,” An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service, ch. 494, 26 Stat.
799, 801 (1891), and in 1894, authorized federal loans of equipment for such organizations, An Act
to Promote the Efficiency of the Naval Militia, ch. 192, 28 Stat. 219, 219 (1894). In 1914, Congress
recognized the “Naval Militia” as part of the organized militia. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012); An Act
to Promote the Efficiency of the Naval Militia, ch. 21, 38 Stat. 283, 283 (1914). Today, a few states
continue to maintain a “naval militia.” But whether a “naval militia” is part of the constitutional
“Militia” seems dubious. A naval militia requires a state to maintain ships of war. And that, in
turn, requires congressional consent under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Given this, the
“naval militia” is likely not part of the constitutional “Militia,” but rather a separate state navy.
And if that is true, the maintenance of such organizations depends strictly on Congress’s consent;
states have no inherent power to organize or arm a naval militia.
57. Mazzone, supra note 36, at 76–77.
58. Id. at 76.
59. WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 82–85.
60. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 4.
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duty.61 In response, the Constitution transformed the militia. The
Framers created a hybrid national-state militia system. The states lost
most policymaking authority regarding the militia, though they
retained control of the militia except in cases of national emergency.62
The national-state hybrid system was the product of compromise
at the Convention.63 The Militia Clauses originated with Charles
Pinckney’s plan to provide Congress with “the exclusive Right of
establishing the Government and Discipline of the Militia . . . and of
ordering the Militia of any State to any Place within [the] U.S.”64
Eventually, this provision evolved into a few distinct proposals,
including one from George Mason on August 18, 1787, that would give
the federal government the power to provide uniformity in the arming
and disciplining of the militia, while reserving the appointment of
officers to the states.65 In considering Mason’s proposal, the delegates
began to fracture in their views. Mason and Pinckney sought uniformity
in the militia because of problems encountered during the
Revolutionary War in having dissimilar forces trying to fight alongside
each other.66 James Madison and Pierce Butler wanted to go further:
because the militia involved “public defence” (or, in Butler’s words,
“general defence”), the militia ought to belong entirely to the federal
government, which was charged with providing for the common
defense.67 George Read disagreed with reserving the appointment of
militia officers to the states; though if the Convention insisted on this,
Read wanted the officers appointed by state governors, rather than by
state legislatures or popular election.68
While Madison and Butler called for a fully national militia, few
at the Convention advocated for the other extreme: leaving the militia
under the plenary authority of the states.69 George Mason, certainly one
of the most ardent supporters of states’ rights during the Convention,
supported regulating the militia at the national level.70 Oliver

61. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 387 (statement of James Madison) (“The States neglect
their Militia now . . . .”).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
63. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 329–33 (surveying the debate that produced the current
system).
64. Id. at 159.
65. Id. at 330.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 331–32.
68. Id. at 333.
69. Luther Martin later claimed to have advocated for state control. See Luther Martin,
Genuine Information VII, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 410–12.
70. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 326.
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Ellsworth came closest to advocating state control when he cautioned
against giving to the federal government “[t]he whole authority over the
Militia.”71
Despite broad agreement to increase federal power over the
militia, the delegates disagreed about exactly how much authority the
states should retain. Arguing against Madison’s strong nationalist
views, Ellsworth wanted to avoid removing the “whole authority over
the Militia . . . from the States whose consequence would pine away to
nothing.”72 Roger Sherman also noted that states may need their militia
“for defence [against] invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing
obedience to their laws.”73 As a result, he also argued against a complete
federal takeover.74 But even Ellsworth proposed giving the federal
government direct control over the militia within a state whenever the
state neglected its militia.75
The Convention resumed debate on the Militia Clauses on
August 23, when the Committee of Eleven proposed a Militia Clause
that, with minor stylistic changes, would become Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 16.76 As in the August 18 debate, the fractured views of the
Convention surfaced. Madison strenuously argued that the militia was
a matter of “National concern” and should belong to the national
government.77 Jonathan Dayton, Ellsworth, and Sherman offered
proposals that would give the states more power over the militia, while
still giving the federal government a limited power to ensure
uniformity.78 Edmund Randolph supported the proposal of the
Committee of Eleven, which he thought was an acceptable compromise
as-is. He complained that the states neglected their militia and that
reserving the appointment of the officers to the states “protects the
people [against] every apprehension that could produce murmur.”79
But Madison was not willing to let go of his attempts to
nationalize the militia as much as possible. Immediately after
Randolph’s attempt to lobby for the Committee’s proposal as an
acceptable compromise, the Convention voted.80 Faced with losing his
proposal to have a complete federal takeover of the militia, Madison

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 384–85.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 387–88.

Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete)

1004

5/22/2020 6:48 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4:989

then proposed having the federal government appoint the generals; the
states would appoint officers under that rank.81 But his proposal met
fierce resistance. Sherman thought that “allow[ing] the Most influential
officers of the Militia to be appointed by the [General] Government”
would consolidate a dangerous amount of military power in one
government.82 Elbridge Gerry, after sarcastically suggesting that the
Convention might as well abolish state governments, warned “[against]
pushing the experiment too far.”83 Madison did not back down. He felt
that only the federal government would adequately provide for the
militia, and having a disciplined militia was the best way to avoid the
need for a large standing army.84 Ultimately, Madison lost the vote
three states to eight, with only New Hampshire, Georgia, and South
Carolina supporting him.85
As a product of these debates, the Constitution granted Congress
plenary authority “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia.”86 Through this provision, the Framers wanted the highest
level of uniformity within the militia as was practicable. Mason said
that “[h]e considered uniformity as necessary in the regulation of the
Militia throughout the Union.”87 Furthering Mason’s point, Pinckney
noted that, “during the [Revolution] . . . dissimilarity in the militia of
different States had produced the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity
was essential.”88 There were some dissenting views on whether the
militia should have “so absolute a uniformity” across states: Dayton
noted that some areas might need more cavalry or require rifles instead
of muskets.89 But whether the militia was absolutely uniform or mostly
uniform across states, the basic point was the same: the transformation
of the separate state militias into a national defense force.
The Constitution charges the states primarily with ministerial
duties regarding the militia. First, they have the responsibility to train
the militia, although this authority extends only to “the discipline
prescribed by Congress.”90 As Gerry mocked during the Convention, the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 388.
See id. (statement of Roger Sherman).
Id. (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
See id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 330.
Id.
Id. at 386.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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states became the “drill-sergeants.”91 Second, states have the authority
to appoint the officers.92
This is not to say, however, that these tasks exhaust the state’s
jurisdiction over its militia. A state’s militia, while not in the actual
service of the United States, is available for all appropriate uses to
which a militia may be put (e.g., assisting state law enforcement when
the civil authorities are inadequate).93 Likewise, a state has concurrent
authority to discipline its militia.94 But this power must be carefully
characterized: while a state has concurrent authority to supplement
federal militia law (e.g., to provide for arming its militia if Congress
does not so provide), a state almost never has preclusive power to
contravene federal militia legislation.95 To analogize from Justice
Jackson’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,96 states have a category
two power over the militia (complementary authority to Congress), but
almost never a category three power (inherent preclusive power).97
David Yassky argues that, even after the Constitutional
Convention, the militia remained primarily a state institution. He
points to a few features of the militia system. First, operational
91. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 385. As I explain below, Gerry’s statement is a bit of an
exaggeration, but it captures the substantial diminution of state control over the militia. See text
accompanying infra note 103.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. The militia is a textually committed counterexample to
Printz v. United States’s general anticommandeering principle: it is one of three instances stated
in the Constitution where Congress can (1) dictate a mandatory policy not connected to any federal
funding; and (2) delegate to state officials—not the president—the execution of that policy. See,
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–25 (1997) (announcing the principle). The other
two counterexamples are the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting Congress the
power to alter state election law concerning congressional elections), and the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (binding state court judges). Indeed, the militia system may also be an
exception to the rule announced in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992), that
Congress cannot compel states to enact certain kinds of legislation.
93. Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 1299, 1304 (statement of James
Madison).
94. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1820).
95. Id. at 16–17:
But as State militia, the power of the State governments to legislate on the same
subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the constitution, and not having been
prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to
the paramount law of the general government, operating upon the same subject.
See generally J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal Preemption of State
Militia Legislation, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 39 (2001) (arguing that courts have not interpreted
the Second Amendment to give states the power to contravene federal legislation governing the
militia).
96. For Jackson’s categories, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
97. The federal government could not directly commission the officers or conduct the training
of the militia, but that probably exhausts the list of activities that would fall within the state’s
preclusive power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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governance of the militia occurred only during the limited times that
the federal government called forth the militia, and federal governance
was limited to the times that the militia was in “actual service.”98
Second, the Constitutional Convention reserved to the states the
appointment of all officers and the authority of training.99 Yassky notes
that the Convention even beat back Madison’s modest attempt to
provide federal appointment of general officers.100 Third, the
Commander-in-Chief Clause states that the president is “Commander
in Chief . . . of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States.”101 From this, he concludes that
“[e]ven when undertaking national tasks under the direction of the
President, the militia remain ‘of the several states.’ ”102
Yassky’s conclusion that the militia “remain ‘of the several
states’ ” overstates state control over the militia following the adoption
of the Constitution. Congress had full authority to dictate the militia’s
structure, weapons, and discipline. The militia remained a “state
militia” only insofar as the states kept usual possession of the militia
and could use their militia for state purposes when the militia was not
in the service of the United States.103 But even during their training,
states’ possession of the militia was subservient to national policy
decisions.104 And contrary to Yassky’s argument, the sharp defeat of
Madison’s general officer proposal was not because state governments
predominate over the militia. Instead, the reservations to the states of
appointing all officers and conducting the training were modest
concessions to state power during a series of debates where the
Convention considered whether to fully nationalize the militia. Because
the Convention had already transferred most authority over the militia
to the federal government, the delegates resisted Madison’s further
attempt to chip away at what little state power remained.
Perhaps reflecting the unusual, hybrid federal-state nature of
the militia, the Framers and their contemporaries even inconsistently
named the militia. Yassky correctly identifies both the Commander-in98. David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change,
99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 606–07 (2000).
99. Id. at 607.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 607 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 23, at 1496 (analogizing to property law by explaining that the
Constitution had transferred “title” of the militia to the national government while allowing states
to retain usual “possession” of the militia).
104. Samuel Huntington correctly noted that the militia is neither state nor federal, but
shared between them. He criticized the arrangement since it entangles the militia “in the
conflicting interests of the federal system.” HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 169.
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Chief Clause105 and the Militia Act of 1792106 as referring to “the militia
of the several States.” But there are numerous examples of contrary
usage referring to the militia as a national force. In Federalist No. 29,
Hamilton argues against “disciplining all the militia of the United
States.”107 The Militia Act of 1792 was entitled “An Act More Effectually
to Provide for the National Defence, by establishing an Uniform Militia
throughout the United States.” The Second Amendment also treats the
militia singularly (“[a] well regulated Militia”), calling it “necessary to
the security of a free State”—by which it means a free country, not a
free Pennsylvania or New York.108 Prior to the 1792 Militia Act, George
Washington submitted a proposal from Secretary of War Henry Knox
concerning a “plan for the general arrangement of the militia of the
United States.”109 Early Congresses routinely referred to the “militia of
the United States.” For example, the Journal of the Senate reports a
proposed bill entitled, “An act to regulate the pay of the noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates, of the militia of the
United States, when called into actual service, and for other
purposes.”110 The Third Congress also proposed to reorganize the militia
by declaring that “the Militia of the United States shall be composed of
all able-bodied white male citizens, of the respective States, resident
therein, [between certain ages].”111
Given the sui generis federalized nature of the militia, it is
difficult to analogize to other governmental bodies. One helpful analogy,
however, might be to a U.S. House delegation. All members of the House
of Representatives are ipso facto members of their state’s House
delegation. And a state’s House delegation, for some limited purposes,
is treated as a distinct entity. For example, under the Twelfth
Amendment, if no presidential candidate receives a majority of the
Electoral College, then each state’s delegation receives one vote. But
calling Nancy Pelosi solely a member of the California House
Delegation states a half-truth. By being elected to the House of
Representatives from California, Representative Pelosi simultaneously
obtains membership in the U.S. House of Representatives and the
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
106. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. II. On the phrase “a free state” meaning “a free polity”—not a state
government free from federal interference—see Eugene Volokh, “Necessary to the Security of a Free
State,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2007).
109. Message from President George Washington to the Senate (Jan. 21, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 6, 6 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832).
110. S. JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1795).
111. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1214 (Joseph Gales ed., 1855) (1795).
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California House Delegation. And, for most purposes, the California
House Delegation consists of nothing more than a subset of the U.S.
House of Representatives elected from California, even though, in
limited cases, it exercises power as a distinct entity. Under the
Constitution, the militia works the same way. All members of the
militia of the United States are members of the militia of the state
wherein they reside. For some limited purposes, each state’s militia is
a separate legal entity: it has, for example, a separate officer corps and
conducts its training separately from the other states. But in the
enumerated emergencies in which Congress and the president may call
forth the militia, each state’s militia is a constitutive part of the
national military forces under the command of the president and
subject to the government of Congress. A member of the militia of the
United States who moves from New York and takes up residence in
Pennsylvania, by that action alone, leaves the militia of New York and
joins the militia of Pennsylvania.
It may be that some of the confusion over the nature of the
militia derives from how our use of the word “militia” has changed over
time. In the Second Amendment context, Chief Justice Burger
characterized the militia as “state armies,”112 a characterization often
accepted by those who adopt the collective-rights view of that
Amendment.113 Under this view, the “state militia” is the name that we
give to the state analogue of the federal army, just as “governor” is the
state executive analogue of the federal president. Using “militia” in this
manner, states can have multiple militias: it might have a National
Guard and a state defense force.114
Although this language is in common use today, the Framers
used the terms differently. When the Framers referred to “the militia”
at the Convention, they were referring to the entire national ablebodied population subject to military service. They sometimes referred
to this as “the whole militia.”115 From the whole militia, there might be
112. Warren E. Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, 1990, at 4, 4.
113. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
114. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 352 (1990) (stating that the federal law authorizing
state defense forces permitted a state “to [have] a separate militia of its own” (citation omitted)).
115. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of John Dickinson); see also Debates of the
Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), supra note 93, at 1312 (statement of George Mason) (“[W]ho
are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers.”); A Letter from
a Gentleman in a Neighbouring State (New York) to a Gentleman in this City, CONN. J., Oct. 31,
1787, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
DIGITAL EDITION 380, 389 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) (“The militia comprehends all the
male inhabitants from sixteen to sixty years of age . . . .”); Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), in LETTERS
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra, at 360, 362 (ascribed to Richard
Henry Lee) (“First, the constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia,
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discrete organized units, a “select militia” in the Framers’
terminology.116 Thus, using the Framers’ terminology, the National
Guard is a “select militia”—what today we call an “organized militia.”
Indeed, the National Guard is only part of the organized militia of the
state.117 A state’s “defense force” or “state guard” is arguably a second
organized component.118 But the United States only has one general
militia from which such forces are drawn.
Thus, the Constitution carefully split power over the militia
between the federal and state governments. During national
emergencies, the militia comprised an essential part of the nation’s
military forces. Outside of those emergencies, Congress set national
militia policy, but Congress had to rely on the states to execute its plans,
including for militia training. Also, states retained the power to select
the officers, which meant the national military system had two chains
of command—a professional chain beholden to federal leaders and a
nonprofessional chain beholden to the states. At least in theory, the
division of the militia offered enough centralization to remedy the
deficiencies of the decentralized system under the Articles of
Confederation. But the Constitution stopped short of vesting all of the
country’s military power in Congress and the president during
peacetime.
C. Practical Implications of Shared Federal-State
Control over the Militia
The shared federal-state authority over the militia is not merely
an academic observation. The federal character of the militia creates
many difficult constitutional and legal issues.
1. Is the Militia Part of the State or Federal Government?
The classification of militia as “state” or “federal” matters for a
variety of constitutional and statutory reasons. One issue is whether a
militia officer possesses “any Office under the United States” for

by providing that the militia shall always . . . include . . . all men capable of bearing arms; and that
all regulations tending to render this general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select
corps of militia . . . [are] to be avoided.”).
116. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of George Mason) (proposing a
select militia for the federal government).
117. 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2012); 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012). The naval militia is statutorily part of
the organized militia, too. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1). But I dispute this characterization above. See
supra note 56.
118. On the questionable status of state guards and state defenses forces as “militia,” see infra
notes 437–445 and accompanying text.
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purposes of the Ineligibility Clause.119 This first became an issue in
1802, when President Thomas Jefferson appointed Representative John
P. Van Ness of New York to be a major in the District of Columbia
militia. The House Committee of Elections studied the issue and
recommended that Representative Van Ness’s seat become vacant
because he “accepted and exercised the office of Major of Militia, under
the authority of the United States, within the Territory of Columbia,
and [hath] thereby forfeited his right to a seat as a member of this
House.”120 During the debates, Representative Van Ness inquired into
whether all militia officers—including those of the territories or
states—could not become members of Congress. He asked:
If it be determined that the militia officers of this District shall be excluded, the same rule
will apply to all militia officers appointed by the Governors of the Territories of the United
States. Do you not also exclude the militia officers of the States, who, though appointed
in the States, are subject to the command of the United States?121

Over Representative Van Ness’s objections, the House
unanimously approved the recommendation.122 The vote was
understood as setting a clear precedent that District militia officers
held offices under the United States and could not simultaneously serve
as members of Congress.123 Of course, Van Ness’s case was
overdetermined: he was a militia officer in the District of Columbia,
which is a federal enclave. Logically, Van Ness could be a federal officer,
even if the militia officers in the states were not. As a result, the
precedent of his case is limited.
Congress studied the issue again in 1916, after the creation of
the National Guard system—but before National Guard officers were
required to simultaneously join the U.S. Army Reserve.124 The House
Judiciary Committee, after examining the extensive federal control
over the National Guard, concluded that National Guard officers held
offices under the United States.125 The full House never acted on the
report. Obviously, classifying the militia as “state” or “federal” is
relevant to determining whether militia officers appointed by the states
are federal officers for purposes of the Incompatibility Clause.

119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. My thanks to Will Baude for pointing out this issue.
120. H.R. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 290 (1803).
121. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 397 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1803).
122. Id. at 398.
123. Id. at 398–99 (statement of John Randolph) (calling this “a precedent so important as was
about to be established by the vote of the House”).
124. On dual enlistment, see infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
125. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RIGHT OF A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS TO HOLD
COMMISSION IN NATIONAL GUARD, H.R. REP. NO. 64-885, at 3 (1916).
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Besides its constitutional significance, the characterization of
militia as “federal” or “state” is relevant to federal statutory law. For
example, in In re Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit decided that the Vermont Army National Guard
could violate the federal Privacy Act by releasing private information
even when the National Guard was not in active federal service.126 Since
the Act does not apply to private data releases by state officers, the
classification of the militia as federal or state matters. And for purposes
of federal jurisdiction over military offenses, nineteenth century court
decisions held that the militia did not become employed by the United
States “until their arrival at the place of rendezvous and muster.”127
On the issue of whether militiamen are part of the state or
federal government, I do not offer a firm answer. For militia officers,
the Constitution vests the power to appoint (and presumably the power
to remove) in state governments, which gives strong reason to classify
them as state officers. But militiamen are, as Representative Van Ness
noted, subject to the command and control of the U.S. government
whether in active service or carrying out Congress’s commands
regarding the militia’s organization, arming, and discipline. Thus,
because of the federal character of the militia, the federal or state status
of militiamen is a close and difficult question. Ultimately, the answer
may depend on the context in which the issue is raised.128
2. May States Refuse to Send Militia Forces?
A dispute over whether states may withhold their militia forces
arose during the War of 1812, when Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island refused to place their militias under the command of army
officers assigned unified geographic commands. An opinion from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court backed these states.129 The
court held that the two chains of command were completely separate:
126. In re Sealed Case, 551 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2009). While serving on the D.C. Circuit, thenJudge Kavanaugh correctly argued in his concurrence that this case might also be overdetermined
since Vermont National Guard members were also members of the “National Guard of the United
States,” which makes them members of a federal reserve force. Id. at 1054–55 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
127. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 95 (2nd ed. 1920) (collecting
authorities).
128. For example, it is possible that militia officers can be treated statutorily as federal
employees even if they are constitutionally state officers. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012) (holding that a penalty for failure to purchase health insurance may
constitute a “tax” under the Constitution, while not being a statutory “tax” for purposes of the
Anti-Injunction Act).
129. See Op. of the Justices, 8 Mass. (8 Tyng) 548 (1812) (opining that the governor of the
commonwealth has the exclusive authority to command the militia).
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no officer of the army had a right to command the militia, and no officer
of the militia had a right to command the army. While Congress could
govern the militia when in the actual service of the United States, the
Massachusetts court opined, “[T]o extend this power to the placing of
them under the command of an officer, not of the militia, except the
president, would render nugatory the provision, that the militia are to
have officers appointed by the states.”130 The court rejected the concept
that the army and militia could form a unified force under the command
of the national government in national emergencies.131
The federal government united in its opposition to
Massachusetts’s position. Although no legislation or formal judicial
opinion ensued on this subject, members of all three branches issued
strong rebukes.
James Monroe, then the Secretary of War, sent the Senate
Military Affairs Committee a long and detailed letter laying out his
view of the relationship between the militia and the army, challenging
the Massachusetts court opinion specifically. Monroe noted that the
Constitution charges Congress—not the states—with determining
when to call forth the militia to meet the constitutionally enumerated
emergencies.132 Requiring the federal government, first, to get approval
of Congress to call forth the militia, and second, to negotiate with state
governments individually, would make the militia practically
useless.133 And Monroe’s position is on strong ground: one of the
motivating factors prompting the Constitutional Convention to increase
federal power over the militia was the refusal of state governments to
supply adequate forces to enforce national laws and suppress
insurrections. If the Massachusetts court were correct, Congress’s
power over the militia in emergencies would be virtually returned to
the disastrous position it held under the Articles of Confederation.
Further, the constitutional text confirms Monroe’s view: the only time
in which state governments must be consulted before militia are called
forth are cases of domestic violence within a state.134 Given the
unworkability of having separate chains of command during wartime,
Monroe noted that the only reasonable response would be for the federal
government to maintain a large standing army, which few at the
Convention preferred. In Monroe’s view, the Constitution was meant to
allow the country to provide for a true national defense. When the
130. Id. at 550.
131. Id.
132. Letter from James Monroe, Sec’y of War, to Senate Military Affairs Comm. (Feb. 11,
1815), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 109, at 604, 605.
133. Id. at 605–06.
134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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federal government gains control over the militia during the
constitutionally enumerated emergencies, states no longer have any
authority over it.135 Like the army, the militia, when in federal service,
is paid and governed by the national government and is subject to the
command of the president. The army and militia are not merely allied
forces. Rather, consistent with the Constitution’s purpose to “provide
for the common defense,”136 the army and militia constitute “one
national force”—a combined force of regulars and irregulars.137
The Senate Military Affairs Committee warmly received
Monroe’s position. While “refrain[ing] from entering into arguments to
fortify the grounds taken by the Executive Government on this subject,”
the Committee nevertheless “express[ed] a decided approbation of its
conduct.”138 The Committee found no authority within the Constitution
to support the states’ position, which, to quote Monroe, “pushe[d] the
doctrine of State rights further than I have ever known it to be carried
in any other instance.”139
Finally, from the judicial branch, Justice Story recorded his
opposition. Justice Story dimly noted that if the Massachusetts court’s
argument were sustained, “the public service must be continually liable
to very great embarrassments in all cases, where the militia are called
into the public service in connexion with the regular troops.”140
As an originalist matter, Monroe’s position on militia officers
and command is correct. The Constitution, while reserving some
authority over the militia to state governments, provided Congress and
the president with supreme power over national defense. At the
Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison explained the importance of
preventing states from obstructing the federal government’s calling
forth of necessary military forces in times of emergency.141
Constitutionally, the militia serves two masters and bridges the
federal-state divide. Even when the militia is under state authority,
militiamen directly execute some federal commands. For instance, the
militia is organized pursuant to federal law, and the militia must train
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. When called into
actual service, the militia is part of the national military leadership
135. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 34–35 (1820).
136. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
137. Letter from James Monroe, Sec’y of War, to Senate Military Affairs Comm., supra note
132, at 606.
138. Id. at 604.
139. Id. at 606.
140. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1210
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
141. Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1272, 1274
(statement of James Madison); see also infra note 423 (collecting authorities on the veto issue).
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under the ultimate command of the president. When they are not in
federal service, however, the militia reports to its respective states.
3. May States Deprive Their Citizens of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms?
The dual nature of the militia also matters for purposes of
federal preemption of state gun control laws. Even absent the
incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states, state
governments cannot interfere with the federal power to call forth the
militia, as the Supreme Court explained in Presser v. Illinois.142 In that
case, the Supreme Court affirmed convictions for parading in a city with
arms and organizing as a private military company. Presser claimed,
on appeal, that those laws violated the right to keep and bear arms and
federal militia law. The Court, in explaining the limits of its decision,
held that its decision only applied to two narrow sections of Illinois law
that prohibited parading as a group with arms and associating as
private military companies. Although, in this pre-incorporation
decision,143 the Court held that the Second Amendment did not apply to
the states, the Court noted:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved
military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view
of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States
cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question [i.e., the Second Amendment]
out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people
from performing their duty to the general government.144

In other words, even if the Second Amendment had not been
incorporated, the states would still lack authority to deprive citizens of
their arms. Whatever concurrent authority the states possess to
regulate the militia of that state, the states cannot exercise that
authority in a way that impairs the ability of the national government
to call forth the militia. A state law that broadly deprived citizens of
their arms would do just that: impair the militia by making it
impossible for citizens to train or to muster for military service at the
call of the federal government during national emergencies.

142. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
143. McDonald v. City of Chicago subsequently applied the Second Amendment to the states.
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
144. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
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D. Military Checks and Balances
In providing for a robust series of military checks and balances,
the Framers paid excruciating detail to the possible combinations of
private and state-sponsored violence. The Framers provided for
protection against private mobs, insurrections against state or federal
governments, foreign invasions, state oppression, violence between
state governments, and federal oppression.145
Part of these reciprocal checks comprised duties of the federal
government to the states and their inhabitants. To protect against
abuses by state governments, the federal government had the duty to
“guarantee . . . a Republican Form of Government” and to protect each
state against “Invasion,” by which the Framers meant not just
invasions by foreign powers, but also invasions by other states.146 The
Constitution also gave the federal government the direct power to call
forth the militia to enforce federal law, suppress insurrections, and
repel foreign invasions without the need to work through state
governments.147
In addition to carefully guarding against abuse by state
governments and lawless mobs, the Framers were concerned about
oppression by federal officials. To prevent the president’s use of the
armed forces for oppression, the Framers provided some horizontal
checks on executive power. While the president is commander in chief,
only Congress can raise an army, provide or maintain a navy, declare
war, regulate the armed forces, or provide for calling out the militia.148
This horizontal division of power has been the subject of lengthy
scholarly discussion, and I will not delve further into this topic until
Part IV.149
145. On the checks being reciprocal, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24,
at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and
these will have the same disposition towards the general government.”).
146. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788),
supra note 93, at 1311–12 (statement of James Madison) (“The word invasion here, after power
had been given in the former clause to repel invasions, may be thought tautologous, but it has a
different meaning from the other. This clause speaks of a particular State. It means that it shall
be protected from invasion by other States.”). In the Federalist Papers, Madison says that the
Article IV guarantee applies to both foreign invasions and to invasions by other states. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 24, at 275–76 (James Madison) (“The latitude of the expression
here used seems to secure each State not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or
vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors.”).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
148. HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 168–69.
149. See, e.g., id. at 177–84, 400–27; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (presenting a framework
for interpreting the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force); Jonathan Turley, The
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But the Constitution also provided vertical checks on military
The militia—the bulk of the people capable of bearing arms—
were to be led by officers appointed by the states, not the federal
government. The states, not the federal government, were to train and
govern the militia, except when in the actual service of the United
States (though the states had the obligation to follow Congress’s policy
judgments on these matters). And after the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, Congress lost any power to deprive citizens of their right to keep
and bear arms.151
Thus, while the armies and navy of the United States remained
exclusively in national control, control over the militia was divided
between the national and state governments. The federal government
could use the militia to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions. In preparation for national defense, it could provide for
the militia’s organization, arming, and disciplining, and it could govern
the militia when it was called to federal service. Beyond setting national
defense policy and having access to the full military power in times of
emergency, the federal government did not govern the bulk of citizens
capable of bearing arms. The militia, thus separated from the
professional services and with a distinct officer staff not beholden to
federal officials, could serve as a check on the illegal use of federal
military power.152
power.150

*

*

*

To ensure an adequate check on federal power by the state
governments, the Framers placed several safeguards in the
Constitution. They separated the “Armies” and the “Militia,” and placed
limitations on the federal government’s power over the militia. Among
these limitations, they required the federal and state governments to
share control over the militia, and they insulated the militia officer
corps from direct federal supervision in peacetime. Today, all of these
checks have been dismantled.

Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 40–47 (2002) (describing textualist and
intentionalist rationales for a distinct military government); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002) (articulating a flexible approach to presidential
war powers).
150. HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 168–69.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
152. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299 (James Madison) (“[T]he existence of
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia officers are
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any
which a simple government of any form can admit of.”).
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II. EXPANDING FEDERAL MILITARY POWER BY COLLAPSING THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA
The first way in which the federal government has gained
control over the militia is by collapsing the organized militia into the
national army through the National Guard system. In this Part, I will
make two claims. First, dual enlistment is unconstitutional because the
army reserve is unconstitutional. The U.S. Army Reserve is an
organized militia—not an army—and is therefore subject to the Militia
Clauses. Second, the present system of dual enlistment of militia
officers violates the constitutional requirement that the states appoint
militia officers. Before delving into these arguments, however, I will
briefly lay out the present militia system.
A. The National Guard: Part Militia and
Part U.S. Army Reserve
Congress has passed two major militia acts. The first such act
was the Militia Act of 1792, which required all free able-bodied white
male citizens between eighteen and forty-five years of age to enroll in
the militia.153 That law required militiamen to obtain certain weapons
and authorized the president to call forth the militia for its
constitutional purposes. Congress reenacted the law in 1795 with slight
changes.154 Congress bolstered the president’s original authority with
the Insurrection Act of 1807,155 the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of
1861,156 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,157 which gave the president
the authority to use either the militia or the armed forces to enforce
federal authority and to prevent interference with state or federal law.
Versions of these laws remain as federal law today.158
Although early Congresses attempted to provide for a universal
militia system, the militia performed badly in the War of 1812, and any
attempt to maintain a universal militia mostly died thereafter.159 The
153. The Militia Act of 1792 comprises two separate laws. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1
Stat. 271 (organizing the militia) (repealed 1903); Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed
1795) (giving the president authority to call forth the militia).
154. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424. Among the changes was eliminating the
requirement that a judicial officer certify the need to call out the militia before the president could
use the militia to enforce the laws.
155. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
156. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281.
157. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15.
158. The current versions of these laws can be found in Title 10, Chapter 13 of the United
States Code. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (2012) (effective Dec. 23, 2016).
159. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 188–
93 (1940).
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militia played a minor role in the Mexican War, although militia units
were a source of federal volunteers for the expanded wartime army.160
During the Civil War, the federal government began relying on federal
conscripts into the regular army in addition to the militia.161 Congress
also expanded enrollment in the militia beyond white citizens.162
Following the Civil War, however, the militia “virtually ceased to exist”
and was replaced with volunteer militia units known as the National
Guard.163 Despite the emergence of the National Guard, the 1792
Militia Act, as amended, remained on the books through the rest of the
nineteenth century, long after the Act was obsolete.164
In 1903, Congress overhauled the militia system with the Dick
Act.165 That Act declared that all able-bodied male citizens (and
residents who intended to become citizens) between the ages of eighteen
and forty-five were members of the militia, and it divided the militia
into a volunteer, organized component—the National Guard—and a
reserve militia. This framework is substantially the same as today’s
militia law.166 The Dick Act also imposed regular training requirements
on the National Guard and prescribed qualifications for its officers and
enlisted personnel. The Act made federal funds and regular army
officers available to help organize and train the militia.
While the Dick Act attempted to modernize the militia, the law
did not solve another irritant of early twentieth-century federal
policymakers: the unavailability of the militia for overseas duty. The
United States maintained only a small standing army, inadequate for
its expeditionary campaigns in Cuba, the Philippines, and other foreign
places. The Militia Clauses only provided for a defensive force, not a tool
to project power around the globe.167
160. JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 91 (1983); see JERRY
COOPER, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MILITIA, 1865–
1920, at 18–19 (1997).
161. See COOPER, supra note 160, at 20–21.
162. Militia Act of 1862, ch. 201, sec. 1, 12 Stat. 597.
163. Wiener, supra note 159, at 191; see also JAMES T. CURRIE & RICHARD B. CROSSLAND,
TWICE THE CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE, 1908–1995, at 8 (2d ed.
1997) (noting that, by the Mexican War, “few states retained an effective militia system”). The
emergence of the National Guard partly had to do with states using the militia to control labor
unrest. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra, at 9.
164. See COOPER, supra note 160, at 109.
165. Militia Act of 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775.
166. See 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2012).
167. In 1908, Congress authorized the organized militia to serve “either within or without the
territory of the United States.” Militia Act of 1908, ch. 204, § 4, 35 Stat. 399, 400. But the Attorney
General concluded that the militia could not be used outside the United States except when the
Constitution otherwise authorized the federal government to call forth the militia (e.g., repelling
invasions). As a result, the president could not use the organized militia as an occupying army.
Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322 (1912).
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Congress attempted to escape the constitutional limitations on
federal use of the militia with the National Defense Act of 1916.168 This
law contained a forerunner to modern dual enlistment. Section 111 of
the Act authorized the president to draft members of the National
Guard into the army in times of war.169 Once drafted, individual Guard
members lost their status as militiamen and became federal soldiers
until discharged.
This system of drafting Guard members created several
problems. First, the draft operated on Guardsmen as individuals, not
as units. Consequently, Guard units lost much of their cohesion as their
members dispersed into the army. Moreover, when the Guard members
were discharged from the army, the National Defense Act did not
automatically revert them back to being members of the National
Guard.170
Congress remedied these issues with the National Defense Act
of 1933.171 That Act required the dual-enlistment system that the
National Guard uses today. All officers and enlisted personnel of the
National Guard simultaneously enroll in two organizations. First, they
enroll in the “National Guard of [a state],” which is the organized militia
of that state.172 Second, they enroll in the “National Guard of the United
States,” which is part of the U.S. Army Reserve.173 The “National Guard
[of all the states]” and the “National Guard of the United States,”
therefore, have coextensive memberships.174 Moreover, unlike the 1916
Act, the federal government can federalize entire National Guard units
rather than merely drafting the Guard’s membership as individuals.
This results in the National Guard having a “dual federal-state status
[that] has been described as ‘murky and mystical.’ ”175

168. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, 39 Stat. 166.
169. Id. § 111, 39 Stat. at 211.
170. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990).
171. National Defense Act Amendments of 1933, ch. 87, §§ 5–6, 11, 48 Stat. 153, 155–58.
172. See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text.
173. See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text.
174. In its brief in Perpich, the Government contended that the membership of the National
Guard and the National Guard of the United States may not be perfectly coextensive. Brief for the
Respondents at 4 n.3, Perpich, 496 U.S. 334 (No. 89-542), 1990 WL 505675 (asserting that “because
no statute requires that all members of the National Guard be members of the [National Guard of
the United States] as well, there may be rare instances in which an individual’s membership in
the [National Guard of the United States] is terminated, while his membership in the state
National Guard is not”). But federal law presently requires the discharge of National Guard
members whose federal recognition is withdrawn. See 32 U.S.C. § 322(a)(2) (2012) (enlisted
members); 32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012) (officers).
175. In re Sealed Case, 551 F.3d 1047, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. United States,
49 Fed. Cl. 673, 676 (2001)).
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The creation of the “National Guard of the United States” as a
component of the U.S. Army Reserve has allowed Congress to use the
personnel and equipment of the organized militia for purposes beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution’s Militia Clauses. For example,
the militia cannot serve in Iraq or Afghanistan; such forces are not
enforcing the laws, suppressing insurrections, or repelling invasions—
the only purposes for which the Constitution allows the federal
government to use the militia.176 To avoid this constitutional problem,
Congress simply changes the militia’s “hat.”177 Thus, when National
Guard units fight in Iraq or Afghanistan, they fight as members of the
“National Guard of the United States”—that is, in their capacity as
members of the army reserve. When performing state militia duties,
they operate as members of the “National Guard of [their state].”
The Supreme Court effectively upheld this scheme in Perpich v.
Department of Defense. In Perpich, President Reagan ordered the
National Guard to train in Central America, but the governor of
Minnesota objected to having the National Guard train abroad.178 These
“training missions” had become divisive: governors alleged that the
President was using the “training missions” to undermine the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.179 The Armed Forces Reserve Act of
1952 required a declaration of a national emergency or a governor’s
consent before sending the National Guard abroad for training.180 When
governors began objecting to the Central American mission, Congress
passed the Montgomery Amendment, which partially repealed the
ability of governors to withhold their consent.181
Perpich upheld the validity of the Montgomery Amendment.
Assuming the validity of dual enlistment,182 the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Guard members were sent for training as
soldiers of the “National Guard of the United States,” not as militiamen
in the National Guard of Minnesota.183
176. See Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322
(1912).
177. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 348.
178. Id. at 336–38.
179. See Carl T. Bogus, What Does the Second Amendment Restrict? A Collective Rights
Analysis, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 503 (2001) (“[T]he federal government ordered more than
12,000 National Guardsmen for active duty training in Central America . . . . President Reagan
wanted to use these exercises to intimidate the Sandinista government in Nicaragua with a show
of force and to assist in developing a staging area for a Contra-rebel invasion of Nicaragua.”); see
also Monte M.F. Cooper, Notes and Comments, Perpich v. Department of Defense: Federalism
Values and the Militia Clause, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 637, 644–45 (1991).
180. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 336–37.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 347.
183. Id. at 349–50.
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Although the Supreme Court assumed the validity of dual
enlistment (because Minnesota did not challenge it), the dualenlistment system has two constitutional infirmities. First, the U.S.
Army Reserve is an organized “militia,” not an “army,” and this
federally organized militia does not conform to the requirements of the
Militia Clauses. Second, dual enlistment, as applied to militia officers,
violates the requirement that state governments appoint militia
officers.
B. Unconstitutionality of the U.S. Army Reserve
The U.S. Army did not maintain a part-time citizen-soldier
reserve force until the twentieth century. The army reserve was
originally created in 1908 to provide medical officers to the army in
times of emergency.184 The 1912 Army Appropriations Act expanded the
reserves by lengthening regular army enlistment contracts and having
regular soldiers serve three or four years in a reserve status.185
Significant organization of the reserves came in 1916 when Congress
expanded the reserves to have a “Regular Army Reserve” and created
the Reserve Officers Training Corps to supply temporary officers in
wartime.186 Following World War I, Congress passed the National
Defense Act of 1920, which overhauled the federal army’s structure.
The army gained a permanent combat reserve corps of officers and
enlisted personnel, and the Act continued the president’s authority to
draft National Guard soldiers.187
The U.S. Army Reserve has several components, including the
Ready Reserve (which itself is broken down into the Selected Reserve,
the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard), the

184. Act of Apr. 23, 1908, ch. 150, 35 Stat. 66; CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 17.
185. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 23.
186. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, §§ 30–55, 39 Stat. 166, 187–97.
187. National Defense Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759. The creation of the U.S.
Army Reserve had no analogue in historical British military practice. As in the United States, the
creation of the British Army Reserve is fairly recent. In 1859, following problems with the Army
during the Crimean War, the first volunteer reserve units formed (“the Volunteer Force”);
Parliament legislated on the subject with the Army of Reserve Act in 1867, which authorized the
creation of reserve forces from the militia and from regular soldiers about to end their enlistment
contracts. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 296–98. This haphazard militia/reserve system ended with
the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, which disbanded the historical British militia.
Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, 7 Edw. 7 c. 9. The Act incorporated the militia—along
with the Volunteer Force and the Yeomanry (which originated as volunteer cavalry regiments)—
into the “Territorial Forces,” which became a reserve component of the standing British Army.
Thus, until fairly recently, there was no history of reserve forces outside of the militia system in
Britain.
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Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.188 The Selected Reserve
portion of the Ready Reserve is the active, drilling reserve (“one
weekend a month, two weeks a year”).189 Active members of the
“National Guard of the United States” are members of the Selected
Reserve.190 The other reserves are a list of names subject to service upon
being mobilized, but not otherwise in an active drilling capacity. My
argument here will focus on the active, drilling reserve—the Selected
Reserve. The National Guard dual-enlistment system is
unconstitutional because the federal government has no constitutional
authorization to keep an active, drilling army reserve.
The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than two Years.”191 The Framers rejected every attempt
to textually limit the Army Clause, except for requiring appropriations
not to extend past two years.192 Given this history, the constitutionality
of the army reserve may seem like an easy case. Why does it matter how
much service the federal government requires of its armies? With no
textual limits on the Army Clause, the federal government can seek
enlistments of one, two, or ten years. Why can it not require forty
weekends of service during those one, two, or ten years instead of fulltime service?
My answer to this challenge is that although the federal
government has plenary authority over its “Armies,” this begs the
question. The force at issue still must be part of the “Armies,” as that
term is understood by the Constitution. The army reserve is not.
Instead, the army reserve is an organized part of the constitutional
militia and should therefore be subject to the Militia Clauses.
In several places, the Constitution differentiates between
“Armies” and “Militia.”193 Congress has the power to “raise and support
Armies.”194 It may “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land . . . Forces.”195 The ordinary rules of criminal procedure do not

188. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 10141–10154 (2012) (providing for and defining these categories
and their subcategories).
189. 10 U.S.C. § 10143 (2012).
190. Id.
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
192. See supra notes 37, 49–50 and accompanying text.
193. See S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 476–77
(1917) (explaining the historical distinction between the two entities). This is not a comprehensive
list of every constitutional provision. In addition, the Constitution makes the president
commander in chief of the army and commander in chief of the militia—but for the latter, only
“when called into actual Service of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
195. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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apply to “cases arising in the land . . . forces.”196 And States are
prohibited from “keep[ing] Troops . . . in time of peace.”197 In contrast,
the federal and state governments share control over the militia.198 And
unlike the land forces, the militia is not subject to military law except
“when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”199 So what
distinguishes “Armies,” “Troops,” and “land forces” from the “Militia”?
“Armies” referred to regular troops, which means that
Congress’s power to “raise and support Armies” could have equivalently
said that Congress has the power to “raise and support regular troops.”
“Militia,” in contrast, referred to the entire able-bodied populace that,
by law, was callable to military service in emergencies and, outside of
those emergencies, was subject (or could be made subject) to periodic
military training. United States v. Miller correctly summarizes this:
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with
Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment
of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate
defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia—civilians primarily,
soldiers on occasion.
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the
Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of
approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. “A body of citizens enrolled
for military discipline.”200

Framing-era sources confirm this usage. In a long passage,
Adam Smith lays this out most clearly in Wealth of Nations, in which
he differentiates “militia” from “armies”:
In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the State can make
any tolerable provision for the public defence.
It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of
the interest, genius and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military
exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of

196. Id. amend. V.
197. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
198. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16.
199. Id. amend. V.
200. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939); see also Burroughs v. Peyton, 57 Va.
470, 475 (1864) (decided under the Confederate Constitution):
An army is a body of men whose business is war: the militia a body of men composed of
citizens occupied ordinarily in the pursuits of civil life, but organized for discipline and
drill, and called into the field for temporary military service when the exigencies of the
country require it;
Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1996)
(drawing similar conclusions from the textual evidence); Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates,
The Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737,
1747 (1995) (same).
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them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession
they may happen to carry on.
Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant
practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular trade,
separate and distinct from all others.
If the State has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to
consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice
of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army,
and the maintenance or pay which the State affords them is the principal and ordinary
fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional
occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of
their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the laborer,
artificer, or tradesman predominates over that of the soldier: in a standing army, that of
the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to
consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.201

Thus, we see two categories of land forces emerge. There are
“armies,” which consist of full-time soldiers. And there are “militia,”
which consist of citizens with civilian occupations who are subject to
occasional military exercises. There is no third category of “armies
subject only to occasional military exercises”—which is what the army
reserve purports to be. Just as “bachelors” are “unmarried men,” a
“part-time army” is a “militia” by definition.
Framing-era commentary demonstrates that this usage of
“army” versus “militia” was widespread, if not universal.202 The debates
at the Constitutional Convention consistently used the terms “army”
and “armies” to refer to regular, professional forces.203 So did the
Federalist Papers. For example, in speaking of how to man peacetime
garrisons, Hamilton stated that they “must either be furnished by
occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the
pay of the government . . . [which] amounts to a standing army.”204
Other Federalist Papers presupposed that armies constituted regular
troops, distinguishing them from the militia, a part-time military
force.205
201. 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 53–54. Part of this quotation is cited with approval in Miller.
See 307 U.S. at 179.
202. “Troops” was used more haphazardly during the Framing. The immediate text following
Adam Smith’s quotation above, for example, speaks of militia being organized into a “particular
body of troops.” 3 SMITH, supra note 31, at 55. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 28, however, uses
“troops” to refer to more permanent forces than “militia.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24,
at 178–79 (Alexander Hamilton). The Constitution seems to equate “troops” with “regular
soldiers.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
203. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 329 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (using “troops”
to describe those manning the army); id. at 617 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (stating that
armies comprise the “military class of citizens”).
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton).
205. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 9, 16 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 20 (James Madison)
(discussing the British Army); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
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The Antifederalist Papers were even more explicit. Richard
Henry Lee wrote, “The military forces of a free country may be
considered under three general descriptions—1. The militia. 2. the
navy—and 3. the regular troops.”206 Lee explained that “[a] militia,
when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render
regular troops in a great measure unnecessary.”207 Consistent with the
usage of Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton, Lee drew a sharp
distinction between “militia” and “regular troops.”
Contemporary newspaper accounts also used the term “regular
troops” to describe those who man an “army.” In discussing why “the
army cannot be employed against [the country’s] liberties,” the
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer wrote, “[R]egular troops, who are
natives of a country . . . bred in the principles of republican
liberty . . . cannot be so generally corrupted . . . .”208 Other examples
abound of writers either directly asserting—or clearly assuming—that
armies comprise regular troops.209
Similarly, other sources maintained the uniform distinction
between regular troops and militia. Thomas Jefferson, writing to James
Madison on the subject of including a Bill of Rights, wrote, “All facts put
in issue before any judicature shall be tried by jury except . . . in cases
cognizable before a court martial concerning only the regular officers &
souldiers of the U. S. or members of the militia in actual service in time
of war or insurrection . . . .”210 Early congressional debates
distinguished the terms this way. In a debate over the Militia Act of
1792, Representative John Page stated, “Soldiers, not a militia, must
be the proper tools for the Government that wishes to enforce its laws
by arms.”211
Chief Justice Taney’s unpublished Civil War opinion on
conscription also made the point when it stated, “The General
power to raise armies under the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation); THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 24, 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (assuming “army” referred to a “regular and disciplined army”);
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 26, 29 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 41, 46 (James Madison) (making similar
assumptions).
206. Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 115, at 362 (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee).
207. Id.
208. Nicholas Collin, A Foreign Spectator, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER (Sept. 21, 1787), reprinted
in COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS,
1787-1788, at 44, 50–51 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
209. See, e.g., Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government (Oct. 21, 1787),
in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at
431, 435–36; Cincinnatus IV: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y.J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra note
115, at 186–87.
210. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 29, 1789), in THE ORIGIN OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 709, 709.
211. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (Joseph Gales ed., 1855) (1789).
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government has no militia, it has only the Army and Navy—The militia
force . . . belongs to the several States and may be called on in the
emergencies mentioned to aid the land and naval forces of the United
States.”212 Members of the army are “a body of men separated from the
general mass of citizen—subject to a different code of laws liable to be
tried by Military Courts.”213
One cannot argue that the Framers and their contemporaries
had no concept of a part-time voluntary soldier. They did, and the
Antifederalists feared them as much as a standing army. Richard
Henry Lee continued:
[T]he constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia, by
providing that the militia . . . include, according to the past and general usuage of the
states, all men capable of bearing arms; and that all regulations tending to render this
general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia, or distinct
bodies of military men, not having permanent interests and attachments in the
community to be avoided.214

In fact, creating something akin to the U.S. Army Reserve was
discussed—and rejected—during the Constitutional Convention. In the
negotiations over which government would control the militia, George
Mason proposed “the idea of a select militia [under exclusive federal
authority]. He was led to think that would be in fact as much as the
Genl. Govt could advantageously be charged with.”215 Charles Pinckney
and John Langdon thought the plan had some merit; both believed that
the distrust of the federal government was unjustified and that
difficulties would arise from splitting authority over the militia between
the federal and state governments.216 Oliver Ellsworth, Roger Sherman,
and Elbridge Gerry opposed it. Ellsworth thought the plan “would be
followed by a ruinous declension of the great body of the Militia.”217
Sherman argued that the states needed organized military forces
because they might have to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, or
enforce their laws.218 And Gerry asserted that the proposal gave too
much power to the federal government.219 Mason’s plan drew both

212. Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE MILITARY
DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 209, 212 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982).
213. Id. at 211.
214. Letter XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 115, at 362 (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee); see
also Lund, supra note 200, at 22 (stating that the “select militia” was “generally considered [a]
perversion[ ] of the true militia”).
215. 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 331.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 332. Ellsworth was right: the existence of the army reserve has placed much less
emphasis on the federal government’s need to provide for the militia.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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support and resistance.220 Ultimately, Mason’s proposal was sent to the
Grand Committee, where it died in favor of the current Militia
Clauses.221 But had the Army Clause encompassed the power to raise
part-time soldiers, the response to Mason’s proposed federal select
militia would have been that Congress already possessed the power to
raise part-time soldiers under the Army Clause.222
If the term “army” could apply to part-time citizen-soldiers,
many of the Framers’ arguments about the federal balance of military
power would not make any sense. In Federalist No. 46, Madison,
responding to concerns about the army becoming a vehicle of
oppression, writes:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be
entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it would not be going too far to say
that the State governments with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger.
The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be
carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls;
or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms.223

Madison’s structural assumptions would be erroneous if the federal
government had the power to create an army reserve. First, the federal
government would have a rapid way of expanding the regular army
without undergoing the significant expense of maintaining it at all
times. This cuts against Madison’s assumption that the expense of a
standing army would be a safeguard against the federal government
maintaining a large one—an assumption Hamilton shared.224
Second, numerous writings assumed that a well-regulated
militia would render a standing army unnecessary.225 But had
eighteenth-century Americans contemplated a reserve force, apart from
the militia, this also would have rendered a large proportion of
permanent troops unnecessary. Such a force would not have had the
expense of a full standing army, but it likely would be better disciplined
than the militia generally.
Third, the Framers intended the militia to have the power to
check the army. But if the federal government had the power to create
military reserves, the federal government could fracture the militia as
a counterbalancing force. The federal government would have (1) the
regular army on its side and (2) a potentially large body of part-time

220. Id. at 332–33.
221. Id. at 333.
222. For Mason’s proposal, see supra note 215 and accompanying text.
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 24, at 299.
224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 24, at 178–79.
225. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 388 (statement of James Madison); Coxe, supra
note 209, at 435.
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citizen-soldiers that report directly to it, rather than to state officers.
The militia would comprise the remainder. Such an arrangement would
have run contrary to the understanding of the Framers. As Noah
Webster said, “The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust
laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and
constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on
any pretence, raised in the United States.”226 Recognizing the power to
create an army reserve destroys the check that the militia was supposed
to provide against the standing army.
Ironically, a federal power to create a military reserve might
have allayed some of the contemporary fears over standing armies.227
Contemporary sentiment feared standing armies largely because
armies comprised a class of military citizens, under military law,
separate from the population generally. To quote Tench Coxe, being a
soldier “is a profession that is liable to dangerous perversion.”228 A
reserve army would not have this problem to the same degree as a
permanent force. Reservists would generally partake in the same
liberty as other American citizens, except in cases of emergency. Thus,
the arguments against a standing army would have taken a different
character if the power to “raise and support Armies” included the
creation of a part-time auxiliary under exclusive federal control.
Finally, combining the power to conscript with the power to
create a reserve would make the constitutional limitations on the
militia meaningless. If Congress could compel ordinary citizens to serve
as part-time soldiers, this means that Congress could force the
population to be available for national emergencies, while having none
of the protections of the Militia Clauses. Part-time soldiers would not
be governed by local officers, they could be forced to train anywhere in
the world, and they could be subjected to military law at any time.
These are all powers that were explicitly denied to the federal
government at the Constitutional Convention.
One might object that the National Guard differs from the U.S.
Army Reserve because the states train the National Guard and appoint
the officers,229 while federal officials train the U.S. Army Reserve and
226. Noah Webster, A Citizen of America (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 38, 40.
227. Other fears would have remained, especially if the military reserve force did not involve
universal service. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
228. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV (Oct. 21, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 54, 55; see also Tench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of
the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Moved on the 8th Instant in the House of
Representatives, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 670, 671.
229. 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012).
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appoint its officers. Under this view, whether an organization is part of
the “Armies” or part of the “Militia” depends on whether the force is
organized pursuant to the Armies Clause or the Militia Clauses.230
But classifying an armed force as an “army” or “militia” in this
manner is a mistake because it confuses the limitations of the Militia
Clauses with constitutive conditions for whether the military force is a
“militia.” There is no evidence that the Framers understood the
difference between “militia” and “armies” to consist in whether, for
example, the officers were appointed by the states or the president.
Instead, requiring the states to appoint militia officers was a restriction
on federal authority over the militia. As David Currie said, “Congress
cannot evade constitutional limitations simply by offending them.”231
Thus, Congress lacks any constitutional power to create the U.S.
Army Reserve. A reserve force, by definition, is a militia. The
Constitution requires that the federal government and the states share
control of part-time forces and that such forces may only be called into
active federal service to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, or
repel invasions. Just as states cannot generally keep regular troops, the
federal government cannot maintain a militia vested in the federal
government alone.
C. Dual Enlistment of Officers
In Federalist No. 29 and Federalist No. 46, Hamilton and
Madison made clear that the militia serves as a counterbalance for the
federal army. This federalism-based check on the military powers had
three components. First, the people had to form a distinct body from the
army. Second, the people had to be armed. Third, the militia required
leadership.232 Only when an armed populace was competently led could
it guarantee the “security of the free state.” The Framers sought to
provide the militia with independent leadership—militia officers not
beholden to the federal government or federal officeholders.
Dual enlistment destroys this independent leadership because a
condition of federal recognition of state National Guard units is that
officers maintain their national commissions. Since 1933, all officers
who are commissioned into the National Guard of a state are
230. National Guard officers, therefore, have to be commissioned under state law (as part of
the organized militia) and under federal law (as part of the National Guard of the United States—
a part of the U.S. Army Reserve).
231. 1 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801, 248 n.88 (1997).
232. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299–300 (James Madison). But not even
Madison, who initially drafted the Second Amendment, thought that an armed populace was
independently sufficient to guarantee a free country.
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simultaneously commissioned into the National Guard of the United
States, a reserve component of the U.S. Armed Forces.233 But only a
limited class of people is eligible for federal recognition of their officer
status.234 And federal law allows for federal recognition to be
withdrawn,235 at which point the officer must be discharged by the
state.236 Failure to discharge the officer would place the state at risk to
lose appropriations, equipment, and other federal benefits for its
National Guard.237 This dual-enlistment system destroys the
separation that the Framers intended between militia officers and the
federal government.
Dividing control over the militia received considerable attention
during the Constitutional Convention. Everyone recognized that the
militia underperformed during and after the Revolution, and
incompetent leadership was part of the problem. Edmund Randolph
blamed state legislators, whom he thought were too interested in
courting popular opinion to impose appropriate militia discipline.238
Remedying the poor state of militia discipline became a central focus of
the Militia Clauses. Two issues received close attention: who would
train the militia and who would appoint the officers.239
On August 21, 1787, a committee of eleven assigned to debate
debts and the militia made the following proposal for congressional
power:
To make laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such
part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the
militia according to the discipline prescribed by the United States.240

Debate on this proposal occurred on August 23, and a consensus
emerged in its favor. The consensus was a compromise over several
competing necessities: remedying the poor performance of the militia,
having interoperability of the militia from different states when called
into national service, the political reality that states would not give up
total control over the militia, and the fact that the states may
occasionally need their militia forces for internal security.241
233. National Guard Act of 1933, ch. 87, §§ 5–6, 11, 48 Stat. 153, 155–58.
234. 32 U.S.C. §§ 305–10 (2012).
235. 32 U.S.C. § 323 (2012).
236. 32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012).
237. See 32 U.S.C. § 108 (2012) (“If . . . a State fails to comply with a requirement of this
title . . . the National Guard of that State is barred, in whole or in part, as the President may
prescribe, from receiving money or any other aid, benefit, or privilege authorized by law.”).
238. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 387.
239. See id. at 330–33, 384–89.
240. Id. at 352.
241. See id. at 385–87.
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The proposal nationalized control over basic defense policy. The
federal government would determine how much training the militia
would have, what weapons the militiamen would possess, and how the
militia would be organized. But that is as far toward nationalization as
the Constitutional Convention was willing to go. As I described above,242
reserving to the states the appointment of officers was not up for serious
discussion; the Convention even beat back Madison’s modest proposal
to allow the federal government to appoint the generals. Immediately
after rejecting Madison’s proposal, the Convention passed the proposal
to reserve to the states the appointment of officers without dissent.243
Before the vote, Randolph noted, “Leaving the appointment of officers
to the States protects the people [against] every apprehension that
could produce murmur.”244
During the debates over ratification of the Constitution, the
Federalists—including
(ironically)
Madison—emphasized
the
reservation of the appointment power to the states as a bulwark against
federal tyranny. Three separate times in Federalist No. 46, Madison
asserted that any attempt by the federal army to effect national
oppression would fail, in part, because an armed populace would be led
by militia officers who would have their loyalty to the local population
and state government. Madison wrote:
[1] [Against a regular army] would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million
of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves,
fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing
their affections and confidence. . . . [2] Besides the advantage of being armed, which the
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the militia
officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. . . .
[3] [Besides being armed] were the [European] people to possess the additional
advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will
and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia by these
governments and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the
greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily
overturned in spite of the legions which surround it.245

Even Hamilton—who was in the minority by advocating for
standing armies and select militias—likewise argued that the state
appointment of militia officers should allay concerns over transferring
to the federal government significant authority over the militia. He
asked:

242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 388.
Id. at 387.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 299–300 (James Madison).
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What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to
prescribe regulations for the militia and to command its services when necessary, while
the particular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? If it
were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the
appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this
circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.246

Although much of the Militia Power (like the Constitution’s
Elections Clause) has substantial areas where the federal government
may require states to carry out federal mandates, the actual
appointment of militia officers is not part of this concurrent authority.
The Framers textually committed this power exclusively to state
governments to provide for a second chain of command within the
military forces. One military chain (the professional services) was
beholden exclusively to the national government and national political
leaders. The other chain (citizen-soldiers) owed its primary allegiance
to the states and their local populace. This would help, first, to avoid
national oppression (the prophylactic purpose). National political
leaders would not command the personal loyalties of all military officers
because they had no role in appointing militia officers. As a result, the
authority of national leaders over the militia and militia officers would
derive from the legitimacy of these political leaders’ actions; it could not
come from some sense of personal obligation that militia officers felt
toward the national leaders who appointed them. And second, in the
unlikely event national oppression did occur, militia officers would lead
the militia against these federal officers (the remedial purpose). This
would not be possible without providing some separation between
militia officers and federal political leaders.
While it is true that the current National Guard system leaves
the technical appointment of officers to state governments, the
reservation of this formality does not satisfy the Militia Officer Clause.
Through dual enlistment, the federal government has required the
states to cede de facto control of their militia officer corps to the national
government. Dual enlistment allows the federal government to
federalize any militia officer at any time for any reason by simply
exercising the Army Power.247 And states lack any power to prevent
their militia officers from being used for nonmilitia federal duties.248
Thus, by requiring National Guard officers to maintain a simultaneous
246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton).
247. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 347–49 (1990) (stating that the congressional
power to call forth the militia as a national army arises under the general Army Power of
Congress).
248. See id. (holding that the governor of Minnesota could not prevent Congress from calling
forth the National Guard for national purposes).
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federal commission, the federal government has evaded its
constitutional obligation to leave militia officers available for state duty
outside the limited federalization authorized by the Militia Clauses.
The dual-enlistment system also violates the Militia Officer
Clause by transferring effective control over the discharge of militia
officers to the federal government. On penalty of losing federal funds,
states must discharge any militia officer who loses his federal
recognition.249 Yet, in Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court
recognized that “[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of
appointment.”250 And in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court held that
“Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment” because
“in practical terms, [it would] reserve in Congress control over the
execution of the laws.”251 Quoting the district court in Bowsher, the
Supreme Court explained that “[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only
the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that
appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his
functions, obey.”252 Under the current National Guard system, the
federal government has de facto independent removal power of militia
officers, including those not in active federal service. Militia officers,
thus, must “fear” and “obey” federal military and civilian executive
officials, even when they are not in performance of federal functions.
This is exactly the result the Framers sought to avoid when (to quote
Hamilton) they committed to the states the “sole and exclusive
appointment of the officers.”253
One might object that federal law does not require a state to
maintain federal recognition. Federal recognition is merely a condition
of receiving federal funds and equipment, to which states are not legally
entitled. State governments may accept the federal funds—which
curtails their authority over state officers—or they may decline the
funds and exercise their power to the constitutional limit. In this sense,
the dual-enlistment system is analogous to the National Minimum
Drinking Age Act at issue in South Dakota v. Dole; that law required
states to set twenty-one as the age to purchase or publicly possess
alcohol, or they would lose five percent of their highway funds.254
The Court in Dole articulated four restrictions on Congress’s
Spending Power. First, the spending must be “in pursuit of ‘the general
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

32 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (2012).
272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926).
478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
Id. (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 24, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted).
483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
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welfare’ ” (or, in this case, “for the common defense”).255 Second, the
restriction must be unambiguous and, third, related to the federal
program at issue.256 Fourth, the spending condition may not run afoul
of other constitutional provisions that may “provide an independent
bar.”257 The first three are not in serious consideration. Restricting
National Guard funding to federally recognized units is in pursuit of
the common defense, the restriction is unambiguous, and it is clearly
related to providing more efficient, better trained military forces. The
only question, then, is whether there is an independent constitutional
bar.
My argument is that the Militia Officer Clause serves as that
independent constitutional bar. Structural considerations may imply
some restrictions on conditional federal funding, whether those
conditions are coercive or not.258 For example, Congress could not
“condition federal funding to any degree on state authorities that
themselves check or control federal authority, most notably state
authority to select federal presidential electors or send two Senators to
Congress.”259 The Militia Officer Clause is a similar kind of provision.
This reservation of state authority encompasses more than formally
extending officers’ commissions. It also implies having an effective
choice as to which officers are selected and the power to decide whether
those officers should be removed. The Framers intended the states to
have the ability to make meaningful officer choices, apart from federal
interference, to ensure the loyalty of militia officers to state
governments and the people.
Apart from these structural limitations on conditional federal
funds, one could also object that granting the president power to
withhold some or all federal funds from states that do not appoint and
discharge militia officers as directed by federal authorities is
unconstitutionally coercive.260 As Lynn Baker has explained, when
states turn down federal conditional spending, “[t]here is no competitor

255. Id. at 207 (quoting Helverig v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)). Because the
Constitution grants Congress explicit power over the militia, militia spending does not implicate
the debate between Hamilton and Madison over the scope of the Spending Clause. Even under the
more restrictive Madisonian view, Congress has power to appropriate money for the militia. My
thanks to Nelson Lund for raising this point.
256. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
257. Id. at 208.
258. See Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV.
357, 400 (2018).
259. Id. (footnotes omitted).
260. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–85 (2012) (discussing
whether congressional financial inducement qualifies as “so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion”).
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to the federal government to which these states might turn for
substitute financial assistance”; and the states’ power to tax directly is
limited to “the income and property remaining to their residents and
property owners after the federal government has taken its yearly share
[of taxes].”261 The federal military budget approaches $700 billion.262
States likely could not impose sufficient taxes on their population to
maintain independent militia forces if they forewent all or most federal
funds. States likely have no choice but to accept the National Guard
system and thereby cede control over their militia officers to the federal
government.
*

*

*

The federal government very much still relies on the militia
system. We no longer call these forces “militia”; they are organized
under names like “National Guard” and “U.S. Army Reserve.”263 And
the militia no longer serves as a check on the national army; it has been
consolidated into the army. The Supreme Court has allowed the federal
government to concentrate all of the national military forces in one
government, a result the Framers strived to avoid.
III. SWALLOWING THE MILITIA WHOLE
The Constitution gave Congress the power to raise an army. And
the Constitution gave Congress the power to compel military service.
This Part asks whether Congress can combine the two: May Congress
compel military service in the army? I argue that Congress may not.
Although obligatory military service is as old as civilization,
conscription into a national, professional army has a shorter historical
pedigree. Historians treat Napoleonic France’s levée en masse, which
began in 1793, as the beginning of national conscription.264 The recent
261. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911,
1936–37 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
262. Office of the Under Sec’y of Def. (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY
2020, DEP’T DEF. 1 (May 2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2020/FY20_Green_Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW9W-UC4V].
263. The present system is not unlike the trained bands of the Elizabethan era, which had a
smaller organized force and a larger class of general citizens that, while largely going untrained,
were nevertheless subject to military service. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 34–35 (describing
the system).
264. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 90–91 (2012) (“In 1793, the world
witnessed the first modern national draft—Revolutionary France’s levee en masse.”); Forrest
Revere Black, The Selective Draft Cases—A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 11 B.U.
L. REV. 37, 43 (1931); Harrop A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA.
L. REV. 40, 68 (1945).
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origin of conscription should not come as a surprise. National armies
require a strong central government to organize and maintain them.265
Even today, in places where the central government is weak, local
militia generally prevail over national armies.266
Historically, in England and in this country, the strength of the
central government has determined whether the government has relied
on armies or a militia. The early English militia was an organization
bred from necessity, not from a philosophical preference for the militia.
The central government was weak and could not afford to field an army
in sufficient numbers.267 The militia was inexpensive for the Crown:
besides the fact that the militia members bought their own weapons,
“only the Muster-Master in each county was a paid crown officer.”268
The Assize of Arms, which reorganized the militia after the Norman
Conquest, required English subjects to purchase military weapons and
report for occasional military service.269 The American militia system
had similar roots, forming long before a strong central government
would have enough power to raise an army.270
As explained in Part I, the Constitution organizes the American
military into three bodies of forces. The federal government has plenary
control over the professional services—the armies and navy—and with
a few minor exceptions, the states have no role to play. The militia, in
contrast, is organized by state with separate chains of command. The
265. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 32–33 (explaining that the professionalization
of the military occurred with the development of the nation-state).
266. For a study on this phenomenon, see Ariel I. Ahram, The Origins and Persistence of Statesponsored Militias: Path Dependent Processes in Third World Military Development, 34 J.
STRATEGIC STUD. 531 (2011).
267. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 36.
268. Id.
269. Assize of Arms 1181, 27 Hen. 2, §§ 1–2 (Eng.); see MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 162. For
example, a person who had a knight’s fee or a free man who had chattels or rents to the value of
sixteen marks was required to obtain chainmail, a helmet, a sword, and a shield, whereas those
free men who had property to the value of only ten marks had to possess a hauberk, iron cap, and
a sword. Assize of Arms 1181, 27 Hen. 2. The Statute of Winchester, in 1285, updated the kinds of
weapons militiamen were required to have, again regulated by their means: the statute divided
the populace into five income groups and required universal service between ages sixteen and
sixty. Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. c. 6 (Eng.); see MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 276. A later
statute, during the reign of Philip and Mary, divided the country into ten classes. BARNETT, supra
note 29, at 23.
270. WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 4:
The American colonies in the seventeenth century were much too poor to permit a class
of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war. Every
colonist had to contribute all the energy he could to the economic survival of his colony,
and no colony could afford to maintain professional soldiers.
Before the Revolution, the colonists’ reliance on the militia would wax and wane depending on the
colonies’ defense needs and the volunteer manpower available. See LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS,
CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 5–8, 45–
46 (1982).
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federal government sets militia policy, and in emergencies, the federal
government directly commands these forces, along with the
professional army and navy. But outside these emergencies, the
professional and nonprofessional services can serve as checks on each
other.
The final major blow to the federalism-based check on federal
power occurred when the federal government assumed the power to
draft into the regular army. The power to conscript soldiers destroyed
the separation between “militia” and “army.” In this Part, I will make
two arguments. First, although I acknowledge that it is a close
constitutional question, the power to use conscription to raise armies
runs afoul of structural limitations on the federal government’s use of
its power to raise armies, as those limitations were understood. Second,
to the extent that a power of conscription is recognized at all, that power
extends only to a draft into the regular army. The federal government
has no power to draft into the army reserve.
A. The Unconstitutionality of Conscription into the National Army
Let me begin by providing the strongest argument in favor of
conscription’s constitutionality. The Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power “[t]o raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years.”271 The text states nothing about how the armies are to be raised.
Consequently, read in total isolation (and, a fortiori, in conjunction with
the Necessary and Proper Clause), the provision appears to support
either voluntary enlistment or a draft.
Debates during and after the Constitutional Convention give
some meat to this argument: proposals to limit the Army Power were
rejected consistently, including some with purely cautionary
language.272 The Constitutional Convention only passed two
amendments to the power to “raise Armies.” One amendment added
“support” after the power to “raise”—which expanded the Army
Power.273 The only amendment cabining the Army Power was the
limitation that Congress could not appropriate funds for armies for
more than two years.274 After the state ratifying conventions, as
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
272. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 37, at 616–17 (rejecting George Mason’s attempt to inscribe
in the Militia Clause “and that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger
of standing armies in time of peace”).
273. Id. at 323.
274. Id. at 505. Elbridge Gerry unsuccessfully proposed limiting the number of men, while
Charles Pinckney introduced language to prohibit keeping troops in time of peace except with the
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proposals for the Bill of Rights were discussed, none of the proposals to
limit the army (e.g., by requiring a supermajority of Congress) or to
declare the army “dangerous to liberty” passed.275
Moreover, the contemporary commentary also discussed the
breadth of this power. Speaking of the military powers (including the
Army Power), Hamilton, in Federalist No. 23, wrote:
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to
define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. . . . [T]here can
be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the
community in any matter essential to its efficacy—that is, in any matter essential to the
formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.276

One commentator, discussing Hamilton’s writing and the refusal of the
Convention and Congress to limit the Army Power, has said that the
limitations on the Army Power are procedural, not substantive.277
Unlike the seventeenth-century Crown in England, the Constitution
does not permit the executive to raise armies sua sponte; only Congress
can do this.278 Standing armies without Congress’s consent, therefore,
are impossible.
The Supreme Court used a textual and selectively historical
reading of the Army Power when it first upheld Congress’s power to
conscript in the Selective Draft Law Cases.279 During World War I,
Congress passed an act authorizing the draft, only the second
conscription act in U.S. history.280 The appellants in these cases were
convicted of refusing to register for the draft.281 In defense, they argued,
inter alia, that Congress lacked the power to institute a draft and that
the power to draft interfered with operation of the Militia Clauses.282

legislature’s consent and limiting the appropriations for “military [l]and forces” for one year. See
id. at 323 (stating that a proposed amendment to limit the number of men was unsuccessful); id.
at 329 (discussing the Pinckney proposal); id. at 341 (“No grants of money shall be made by the
Legislature for supporting military Land forces, for more than one year at a time.”).
275. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 24, at 153–54 (Alexander Hamilton).
277. Michael J. Malbin, Conscription, the Constitution, and the Framers: An Historical
Analysis, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 805, 814 (1972).
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. II.
279. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 376–78 (1918).
280. An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of
the United States, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76. The first conscription act was passed by Congress
during the Civil War and is discussed below since its validity was never ruled on by the federal
courts. See An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes, ch.
75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
281. Arver, 245 U.S. at 376.
282. Id. at 376–77.
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The Court unanimously—and somewhat perfunctorily—rejected
these arguments. First, the Court argued that the Army Power would
be useless if Congress could not compel military service.283 Since an
army must comprise soldiers, the Court argued, an Army Power that
depended on citizens voluntarily enlisting for military service would be
useless because citizens could nullify the Army Power by withholding
their consent to enlist.284 An Army Power that did not include the power
to conscript would reduce the government to something less than a true
sovereign, for the exercise of power sometimes requires compulsion.285
The Court then provided some historical and textual reasons to
support Congress’s power to conscript. The Court discussed briefly some
history of required military service in Anglo-American law, from before
the Norman Conquest to the American colonies.286 (It is important to
note that the Court ignores that these statutes regulated military
service in the militia, not in the professional, standing army.) Textually,
the Court noted that the Militia Power is separate from the Army
Power.287 According to the Court, the Militia Power grants additional
authority to Congress to regulate military forces, but the Militia Power
is not a limitation on the Army Power.288 Thus, the Court held that
Congress’s exertion of the Army Power did not impede the Militia
Power, despite Congress having drafted most of the militia into the
federal army.289
The Court then bolstered its historical argument. It noted that
President Madison and his Secretary of War James Monroe proposed a
federal draft for the War of 1812. The Court did not seriously consider
the opposition to the draft in 1812, saying that it “substantially rested
upon the incompatibility of compulsory military service with free
government” rather than on constitutional objections.290 Finally, the
Court examined the Civil War precedent.291 It referenced that President
Lincoln successfully instituted a draft in 1863, which was affirmed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kneedler v. Lane,292 and that
Confederate courts had likewise upheld the Confederate draft under
their analogous constitutional provisions.293
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 382–84.
Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 386–88.
45 Pa. 238 (1863).
Arver, 245 U.S. at 386.
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The Court’s first argument—that the Army Power would be
useless without conscription—is quite weak. As Leon Friedman
previously argued, the “necessity argument” could be applied to any
federal power: the post office, the mint, even the federal judiciary.294
But the need of a federal entity to have individuals to populate it does
not imply that Congress possesses the power to compel individuals to
serve in that entity.295 For example, Congress is not thought to possess
the power to draft postal carriers or federal judges.296 The power to
provide for a postal service most naturally confers on the federal
government the authority to employ persons as postal carriers to
transmit the mail. The government populates the post office by
participating in the labor market and offering sufficient wages to
attract postal employees. Similarly, the Army Power authorizes the
federal government to raise an army by voluntary enlistment, which is
the manner in which armies had theretofore been raised. Nor is this a
trivial conferral of power, for the federal government arguably lacked
any power to enlist professional soldiers in peacetime under the Articles
of Confederation.
Moreover, the textual argument appears weaker when one looks
across constitutional text, rather than just at the Army and Militia
Clauses in isolation. The Fifth Amendment begins, “No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger . . . .”297 Here, the Framers clearly
differentiated the professional forces and the militia. The professional
services are always subject to military law, whether or not they are in
active service; a member of the army can be court-martialed for
activities that occur off-duty with no nexus to his service.298 But the
authority over the militia is different: the government can only apply
military law “when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”299
This limitation on federal power over the militia resulted from the
Framers’ desire to secure against a potential loophole in constitutional
criminal procedure rights. Because the militia encompasses all ablebodied men who are members of the political community, generally
294. See Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1497–98 (1969).
295. Id.
296. See id. (“No one ever suggested before the Arver case that any other enumerated power
included authority to compel service in the governmental organization involved.”).
297. U.S. CONST. amend V.
298. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 450–51 (1987).
299. U.S. CONST. amend V.
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exempting the militia would have allowed the federal government to
subject most of the political community to military law at all times. Men
would only have had ordinary criminal procedure rights when they
were infants or well within middle age.300 The Fifth Amendment
exemption was thus not a federalism provision that divided when state
forces would be subject to federal discipline. Quite the contrary, it was
a personal right to secure American able-bodied men against being
subjected to federal military law, except when performing federal
military duties. Recognizing a broad power to conscript undermines this
protection.301
Interpreting the Army Clause as encompassing the power to
conscript also unwinds the protection of the original Militia Clauses.
Congress may call forth the militia only “to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”302 And the
Training Clause reserves to the states “the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”303 These
constitutional limitations, which are similar to British limitations on
the militia, protected American citizens from burdensome travel for
military purposes, except in cases of national emergency.304 Without

300. See, e.g., Maryland Ratifying Convention, supra note 49, at 734 (remarking that “all other
provisions in favor of the rights of men would be vain and nugatory, if the power of subjecting all
men, able to bear arms, to martial law at any moment should remain vested in Congress”); Luther
Martin, Address No. 1, MD. J., Mar. 18, 1788, in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION, supra note 115, at, 397, 401 (cautioning against federal
militia conscription by likening conscription “contrary to the will of the state” to “martial law” and
slavery); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to
their Constituents, PHILA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 164, 201, 220 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“The personal
liberty of every man, probably from sixteen to sixty years of age, may be destroyed by the power
Congress ha[s] in [the] organizing and governing of the militia.”); Foreign Spectator, Remarks on
the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Proposed by the Conventions of Massachusetts, NewHampshire, New-York, Virginia, South and North-Caroline, with the Minorities of Pennsylvania
and Maryland, by a Foreign Spectator: Number VIII, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1788,
reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 567, 569–70 (“A citizen,
as a militia man is to perform duties which are different from the usual transaction of civil society;
and which consequently must be enforced by congenial laws and regulation.”).
301. This is especially true if the power to conscript includes the power to conscript into the
army reserve. If the federal government can conscript part-time citizen-soldiers (a power I deny
below), the Army and Militia Powers become totally coextensive, except that the federal
government can avoid the constitutional limitations on the militia by purporting to raise the force
using its Army Power.
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
303. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
304. British law prohibited marching the militia out of one’s county, except in cases of invasion
or rebellion—a law that ceased burdensome foreign militia deployments occurring during the
reigns of King Edward II and King Edward III. Statute the Second 1326, 1 Edw. 3 c. 5 (Eng.); 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *398; MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 277; see also Militia Act 1776,
16 Geo. 3 c. 3 (Gr. Brit.) (prohibiting sending militia out of the county, except in cases of invasion

Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete)

1042

5/22/2020 6:48 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4:989

these limitations, many Antifederalists feared that the federal
government would subject the militia to harsh punishments and other
burdens, such as for travel, and these burdens would cause Americans
to support raising a standing army in place of performing militia
service.305 Yet, through conscription, Congress can evade the
limitations on its Militia Power by requiring citizens to perform
military service in the army rather than in the militia.
Congress’s modern use of the Army Power as a supplement to
the Militia Power came about in the early 1900s precisely to avoid the
limitations on the Militia Clauses.306 During the early twentieth
century, the United States engaged in military actions overseas.307
Congress wanted to use state National Guards to supplement regular
forces, but Attorney General George Wickersham opined that the
militia could not generally be used beyond the country’s borders.308 By
simultaneously enrolling citizens in both a state Guard and an army
reserve unit, Congress sought to access these forces for international
missions by calling them out as “armies” rather than as “militias.”
Authorizing conscription thus unwinds the personal liberties the
Framers placed in the original Constitution concerning military service.
It leaves the general citizenry subject to military law at Congress’s
whim. Congress may send conscripted citizens to foreign countries to
train and fight, and as long as Congress places an “army” label on them,
the restrictions on the federal government calling forth the militia or
selecting the officers no longer apply. Even if the power to raise armies,
when read in isolation, would support a power to conscript soldiers, the
power to conscript soldiers does violence to many other constitutional
provisions when the Constitution is read more holistically.
To analogize to criminal prosecutions, it is as if Congress had
passed a law providing, “Failure to pay taxes results in a civil penalty
of life in prison,” and then authorized a nonjury trial before an
administrative officer. Congress cannot avoid the Bill of Rights by

or rebellion); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16 (limiting the ability to call forth the militia and
reserving to the states the authority of training the militia).
305. See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), supra note 93, at 1300–01
(statement of Patrick Henry); id. at 1303–04 (statements of George Mason). The Court in Perpich
seems to miss this point completely. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 350–51 (1990)
(failing to discuss the history behind the inclusion of the Training Clause).
306. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 23.
307. See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 295–341 (discussing sending U.S. forces abroad
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the reorganization of the U.S. military
to accommodate such endeavors).
308. Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322 (Feb. 17,
1912).
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labeling a crime as a civil penalty.309 Likewise, Congress cannot avoid
the restrictions on the Militia Clauses by calling the militia an “army.”
Moreover, the historical record is not as favorable as the
Selective Draft Law Cases suggest. Although England had
impressment, it mainly affected the drunk and idle as punishment.310
Conscription bills that were introduced in British Parliament in 1704
and 1707 were attacked as unconstitutional,311 as was Madison and
Monroe’s conscription proposal. The Court noted that Daniel Webster
objected to conscription on general principles of free government—
which he did. But he also objected to the plan as a violation of the
Constitution because it sought to avoid the limitations on the Militia
Clauses by relabeling the militia as an “army”:
But, Sir, there is another consideration. The services of the men to be raised under this
act are not limited to those cases in which alone this Government is entitled to the aid of
the militia of the States. These cases are particularly stated in the Constitution—“to repel
invasion, suppress insurrection, or execute the laws.” But this bill has no limitation in
this respect . . . .
This, then, Sir, is a bill for calling out the Militia not according to its existing organization,
but by draft from new created classes;—not merely for the purpose of “repelling invasion,
suppressing insurrection, or executing the laws,” but for the general objects of war—for
defending ourselves, or invading others, as may be thought expedient;—not for a sudden
emergency, or for a short time, but for long stated periods . . . . What is this, Sir, but
raising a standing army out of the Militia by draft, & to be recruited by draft, in like
manner, as often as occasion may require?312

Ultimately, the conscription bills died in Congress when the House and
Senate could not resolve their differences over conscripts’ length of
service.313
Conscription would not reemerge until the Civil War when
Congress passed the Enrollment Act in 1863. The Act authorized the
president to conscript, with some exceptions, citizens (and those
intending to become citizens) between the ages of twenty and fortyfive.314 The Act was not a full conscription act since the draftee could
309. See Int’l Union, Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 838 (1994) (holding
that “the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative” in the context of
a debate regarding whether it was sufficient to label a fine as a civil penalty in order to proceed
with using process associated with civil proceedings); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (finding that functions, not labels, determine whether a fee is a tax or a
penalty).
310. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41.
311. Freeman, supra note 264, at 68–69.
312. Daniel Webster, An Unpublished Speech, in THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS
ON CONSCRIPTION, supra note 212, at 633, 634–35 (December 9, 1814 speech on the conscription
bill made on the floor of the House of Representatives).
313. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 157–58.
314. An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes, ch. 75,
§ 1, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
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hire a substitute at a cost of up to $300, so it operated as a choice
between compulsory military service or paying a fee.315
Like conscription during the War of 1812, the Enrollment Act
was vigorously resisted. The Act resulted in riots in several cities,
including New York City in July of 1863.316 No federal court challenge
made it to the Supreme Court. Anticipating a challenge, Chief Justice
Taney prepared a draft opinion holding the Enrollment Act to be
unconstitutional.317 He approached the militia/army dichotomy from a
different perspective than my argument above. In his view, the militia
and the army were quite separate organizations under different
sovereign authorities.318 State governments were independent
sovereigns—to the point where the Constitution did not authorize the
federal government to quell internal rebellions against the state
without a specific request from state authorities.319 For Chief Justice
Taney, the militia belonged to the states as their sovereign force.320 The
militia was a force over which “the general government can exercise no
power in time of peace, and but a limited and specified power in time of
war.”321 The army, in contrast, comprised men separated from the
general body of citizens and subjected to exclusive federal authority.322
Recognizing the power to draft would destroy state governments and
the state militia. Nothing would stop the federal government, for
example, from drafting state judges and making them privates in the
national army.323 A power to draft, thus, would leave entire state
governments at the mercy of federal legislation. The state would not
have any real power over its militia because the federal government
could draft the entire militia into the federal army. Given that the
Constitution specifically laid out emergency federal military powers,
including the power to use all the militia from every state, Chief Justice

315. § 13, 12 Stat. at 733; see also AMAR, supra note 264, at 91 (“Because the 1863 law allowed
individual draftees to buy their way out—by providing a substitute or paying a fee—many
supporters claimed the law was technically a tax and not a system of direct conscription.”).
316. See LESLIE M. HARRIS, IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1626–1863, at 279–85 (2003); MAHON, supra note 160, at 103.
317. Taney, supra note 212, at 208–18.
318. Id. at 211–12.
319. Id. at 207, 217 (“For in the case of rebellion or insurrection against the State government,
the United States is not allowed to interfere in it, to support the State authority, unless its
assistance is applied for by the Legislature of the State or by the Executive where the Legislature
cannot be convened . . . .”).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 211.
322. Id. at 210–11.
323. Id. at 216.
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Taney opined that recognizing the power to draft into the army would
make the Constitution internally inconsistent.324
While the constitutionality of the Enrollment Act never made it
to the federal Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did
have an opportunity to address its constitutionality in Kneedler v.
Lane.325 In that case, a heavily divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court
originally held the federal draft to be unconstitutional by a 3-2 vote,
only to reverse itself immediately.326 Chief Justice Lowrie’s original
opinion—which would ultimately be reversed—relied on similar
arguments to Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion. Chief Justice Lowrie
argued that military necessity could not justify conscription. If the
standing army was insufficient to put down the Confederate rebellion,
he argued that the Constitution provided the means for more troops:
calling forth the militia.327 The contemporary disorganization of the
militia, Lowrie thought, was irrelevant: Congress had the power to
organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and, having long known of the
problem, it could correct this situation by legislation.328 And drafting
the able-bodied male population into the army during a rebellion
constituted a de facto calling forth of the militia—but done in a way that
subverts the structural limitations placed within the Constitution.329
Given that the Constitution specifically provided for how the ablebodied populace was to be called forth during such an emergency, Chief
Justice Lowrie was loath to find this same power—but without the
restrictions over the militia—in the Army Clause.330
Moreover, recognizing a general power to conscript would work
enormous mischief to state governments. The army would have the
power to totally consume the militia, thereby leaving the states
defenseless to internal disturbances. Even militia officers—who were

324. See id. at 212–13; see also Coxe, supra note 209, at 431, 435–36 (describing a militiabased check of the federal army); Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of
the Federal Constitution (October 10, 1787), in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra
note 27, at 38, 39 (“[Congress is not] at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure—but only, to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. For these purposes,
government must always be armed with a military force . . . .”).
325. 45 Pa. 238 (1863).
326. Id. at 240, 252, 274, 294–95.
327. Id. at 242.
328. Id.
329. See id at 244–45 (stating that drafting all men from twenty to forty-five “exhausts [the
militia] entirely” and creates an “unauthorized substitute for the militia of the states,” completely
“annul[ling], for the time being, the remedy for insurrection provided by the constitution”).
330. Id. at 242–43. A fortiori, one could apply Chief Justice Lowrie’s reasoning to the army
reserve, which gives the federal government the same type of part-time force as a militia, without
the restrictions contained in the Militia Clauses. See 10 U.S.C. § 10102 (2012) (describing the
reserves’ purpose to supplement the regular forces in an emergency).
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supposed to be separate from the federal army—would be subject to a
draft, thereby leaving the militia without leadership.331 And nothing in
the Constitution would prohibit drafting state officials, leaving the
entire state government at the mercy of Congress’s whims regarding
who to conscript.332
The dissenters focused on the unqualified nature of the Army
Clause; its only limitation is that appropriations not exceed two
years.333 They further argued that the federal government possesses the
same attributes of sovereignty as any other nation, one of which is to
compel military service of its citizens.334 And service in the army—as
opposed to the militia—may be required for the United States to defend
its treaties and fulfill its foreign policy obligations.335 Moreover, the
dissenters noted, Britain practiced impressing soldiers and sailors,
Parliament had debated conscription bills at various times in the
eighteenth century, and the American colonies regularly required
military service.336
Ultimately, the dissenters’ opinion carried the day. Chief Justice
Lowrie left the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shortly after the original
decision was issued. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court immediately
reversed itself and dissolved the injunction against the Enrollment
Act.337
I have argued above for why the textual and structural
arguments made by the original dissent are unpersuasive. But one
further point in the Kneedler dissent must be addressed. As the
dissenters correctly explain, the history of impressment poses a
significant challenge to those arguing for the unconstitutionality of
conscription.338 Impressment became popular in Elizabethan England
because the country was engaged in foreign wars, and the militia was
331. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 246.
332. Id. at 245–46.
333. See id. at 276 (Strong, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the clause conferring authority to raise armies,
no limitation is imposed other than [the appropriation restriction], either upon the magnitude of
the force which Congress is empowered to raise . . . or upon the mode in which the army may be
raised.”).
334. Id. at 275.
335. Id. at 275–76.
336. See id. at 278–79 (recalling that Britain passed a law allowing all unemployed men to be
conscripted and that states had used the draft as a last resort); id. at 290–91 (Read, J., dissenting)
(responding to the majority’s argument that the Framers contemplated voluntary enlistment
because that was what Britain used and noting that Britain had long used impressment for both
the British army and navy).
337. See id. at 295 (majority opinion of Strong, J.) (disclaiming the authority to issue the
injunction in the first place and dissolving the injunction).
338. An impressed soldier or sailor is forcibly abducted into service under color of law (e.g.,
lawfully taken from the tavern and forced to serve), whereas a conscript is merely required to
report for induction.

Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete)

2020]

FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER

5/22/2020 6:48 PM

1047

not liable to serve outside of the kingdom. With the inability to recruit
sufficient numbers of enlistments, the Crown demanded specific
numbers of troops by commissions of array, and lords-lieutenant filled
the quota with impressment.339
The legality of impressment fell into a murky area. No statute
ever authorized impressment of soldiers or sailors. At best,
parliamentary statutes tacitly assumed the validity of the practice.340
Those who were impressed were often unemployed, drunk, or petty
criminals.341 Impressment into the army also only occurred when
Britain was involved in foreign wars; Britain did not maintain a
standing army in peacetime.342 Maitland further notes that the pressing
of soldiers was far more controversial than the pressing of sailors; the
former was the subject of several parliamentary petitions, while the
latter escaped notice.343 To the extent that impressment may be viewed
as a historical antecedent to conscription, the legitimacy of conscription
into the navy may stand on a firmer footing than conscription into the
army.344 But the precedent of impressment—which the Constitution
does not explicitly ban—also illustrates why the constitutionality of the
draft is a close and difficult question.
Some commentators, recognizing the problematic nature of the
draft, have offered new justifications for its legitimacy. The first theory
is from Akhil Amar. Amar looks to the history surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.345 These came about,
first, because the Union Army—in part, a conscripted army—defeated
the South. The militia system disintegrated during the Civil War, with
Southern states defecting completely and Northern states unable to
supply enough troops or training to deal with the crisis adequately.346
Second, the Reconstruction Army (which was not conscripted)
maintained republican government in the South after the Civil War.347
339. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41.
340. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *418–19 (noting that a statute from 1378, 2 Rich. 2
c. 4, refers to “mariners being arrested and retained for the king’s service”); MAITLAND, supra note
32, at 278 (writing that a 1557 act, 4 & 5 Phil. & M. c. 3, “speaks of mustering and levying men to
serve in the wards as a recognized legal practice”); see also MALCOLM, supra note 34, at 3–5
(detailing that a tax helped pay for the king’s armies, which were organized by local magnates like
lords-lieutenant).
341. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 41–42. Wealthier and otherwise virtuous citizens found ways
to avoid impressment by providing substitutes or bribing justices of the peace. Id. at 42.
342. MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 279.
343. Id. at 280.
344. See, e.g., Taney, supra note 212, at 213–14 (considering this possibility).
345. AMAR, supra note 29, at 91.
346. Id. at 90–91. But see MAHON, supra note 160, at 103 (“[C]onscription swept in only 6
percent of the total Union force.”).
347. AMAR, supra note 29, at 91.
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Given that nothing in the Constitution explicitly prohibits a draft—
these are underlying structural interpretations of the Militia and Army
Clauses—Amar argues that our understanding of how these clauses
interact should change in light of the primacy of the Union Army in
preserving “the security of a free State” during Reconstruction.348 Amar
concludes, “No longer could it be insisted that the localist militia was
always America’s constitutionally preferred force structure to vindicate
the Constitution’s deepest values and secure its most sacred
principles.”349
A second, related theory is offered by David Yassky, who argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment legitimized the draft.350 The
Amendment made national citizenship primary—and one of the duties
of national citizenship is military service in the army. The militia,
Yassky argues, was viewed as the defender of Southern slavery
compared with the liberating Union Army.351 Moreover, the Civil War
changed which government citizens viewed as threatening liberty. Prior
to the Civil War, citizens were mainly afraid of federal power. After the
Civil War, citizens viewed state governments as more threatening.352
These arguments present numerous substantive and
methodological difficulties, only some of which I will respond to here.
First, I disagree with the premise that the “localist militia was always
America’s constitutionally preferred force structure to vindicate the
Constitution’s deepest values.”353 This premise is partially true. Though
there were some outliers (e.g., Alexander Hamilton), other things equal,
most of the Framers preferred the militia system to a professional army.
But many Framers realized that often other things were not equal (e.g.,
state governments being derelict in defense matters), which caused
them to authorize a strong federal role in national defense. More
pertinently, the Framers inscribed their distrust of state governments
into the Constitution. Thus, Article IV grants the federal government
the power to guarantee a “Republican Form of Government” to the
states, which it can enforce using federal military power.354 Article I,
Section 10 prohibits states from having a professional army or navy in
peacetime without Congress’s consent.355 And the Constitution
348. U.S. CONST. amend. II; AMAR, supra note 29, at 91–92 (arguing that a textualist approach
to the Constitution does not capture developments that were necessary to the survival of the
United States).
349. AMAR, supra note 264, at 91.
350. Yassky, supra note 98, at 638–47.
351. Id. at 647.
352. Id.
353. AMAR, supra note 264, at 91.
354. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–44 (1849).
355. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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conferred on Congress the power to use federal and militia forces to
defend federal authority.356 The militia may “always have been
preferred,” but the use of federal troops during Reconstruction was also
in keeping with the spirit (and letter) of the original Constitution. The
federalism-based checks on the military power were reciprocal, not onesided: the Framers recognized that the states could also misuse their
power. Viewed in this light, I disagree that Reconstruction marks the
paradigm shift that Amar and Yassky argue.
A second difficulty is that Amar’s and Yassky’s conclusions do
not follow from their premises. Two important differences between the
Army Clause and Militia Clauses are that (1) the army is available for
foreign wars, whereas the Militia Clauses apply only to domestic
emergencies; and (2) the militia cannot be subjected to military law,
except when in actual service. Whatever the lessons from the Civil War
and Reconstruction, they do not seem relevant to making citizens liable
to serve in foreign wars and to always be subject to military law.
Allowing the federal government to exercise these powers does not
follow from the reversal of seeing state governments—rather than the
federal government—as the primary danger to civil liberties.
To conclude, conscription into the regular army is likely
unconstitutional as an original matter, and the Fourteenth Amendment
should not be construed to grant that power. Recognizing federal power
to conscript into the army does immense violence to the limitations of
the Militia Clauses and the personal rights of citizens available for
temporary military duty. An unlimited power to conscript effectively
gives the federal government a national militia without the
constitutional restrictions. Moreover, if Congress can draft the entire
militia into the army, the militia cannot serve as a counterbalance to
the army. The result, again, is one body of troops, not the separate
bodies envisioned by the constitution that provide checks on each
other’s power.

356. During the Pennsylvania Mutiny of 1783, Revolutionary War veterans marched on the
Pennsylvania State House, causing Congress to flee to New Jersey. Congress tried, but failed, to
secure the Pennsylvania militia to protect them. The event led the Framers to authorize both a
federal city to host the seat of government and direct authority to use force to suppress
insurrections against federal authority. See 3 STORY, supra note 140, § 1214; Kenneth R. Bowling,
New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the War
for Independence, 101 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 419, 420 (1977); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
775, 847 (1994).
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B. Conscription into the Reserves
Those who have examined the constitutionality of the draft
generally have considered two issues: first, whether the federal
government has the power to conscript into the army or if, instead, the
power to conscript is limited to the militia; and second, whether the
power to institute a draft extends to peacetime—or, alternatively, to
conflict in the absence of a declared war.357 But there is a third, more
nuanced issue: Assuming arguendo that Congress has some power to
conscript into the army, does that power extend to conscription in the
army reserve? Although resumption of the draft seems unlikely in the
near term, occasional bills to reinstate the draft have proposed
authorizing federal conscription into the reserve forces.358 This Section
argues that conscription into the reserves is patently unconstitutional
and that, even accepting the legitimacy of the draft into the army, the
Supreme Court would have strong reasons to limit Congress’s
conscription power to drafting citizens as full-time, regular soldiers.
The Supreme Court has not decided the precise scope of the
federal government’s conscription power. In the Selective Draft Law
Cases, the Court upheld the World War I conscription law on the basis
of the powers to declare war, raise armies, make rules for land forces,
and make laws that are necessary and proper.359 Draft opponents
during Vietnam seized on this language and challenged the
constitutionality of the draft in the absence of a declaration of war by
Congress. Lower courts rejected these arguments, and the Supreme
Court never granted certiorari to hear their claims.360 The Selective
Draft Law Cases had held that the Militia Clauses did not limit the
federal draft power, and all cases since then have used broad language
to describe Congress’s power to raise forces using the Army Power. In
United States v. O’Brien, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,

357. See supra notes 264 (examining a draft at peacetime), 277 (examining army conscription),
& 294 (rebutting the “necessity argument” for conscription).
358. See, e.g., Universal National Service Act of 2003, H.R. 163, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(1)
(proposing a mandatory two-year period of national service that could include service in the
reserves).
359. Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8).
360. See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 936 (1968) (denying certiorari); id. at
936–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I think we owe to those who are being marched off to jail for
maintaining that a declaration of war is essential for conscription an answer to this important
undecided constitutional question.”); see also Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245, 265–66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had not decided peacetime
draft limits).
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said that “[t]he power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower
for military service is ‘beyond question.’ ”361
Even if Congress undoubtedly has the power of conscription, it
does not follow that this power extends to the army reserve. As the
previous Section explains, whether the federal government had the
power to conscript people into the regular army was a difficult question
at the Framing. In contrast, early congressional debates demonstrate
beyond peradventure that the federal government lacked the power to
conscript citizens into a federal reserve force.
Although the concept of a permanent reserve corps dates from
the early twentieth century, Congress created a temporary reserve-like
force in 1799 during the undeclared war with France.362 Congress
authorized the president to create a provisional army, if the president
deemed it necessary in the event of war, invasion, or imminent danger
of invasion.363 As part of that army, the president could accept voluntary
associations of individuals who offered themselves as artillery, cavalry,
or infantry units.364 These individuals would arm and equip themselves,
would have officers appointed by the president, and would be liable to
serve “at any time the President shall judge proper” for a period of two
years after the president accepted their willingness to serve.365 These
voluntary associations, only when in actual service, would be governed
by the same rules and regulations as the army and would receive the
same pay as regular soldiers.
While Congress ultimately enacted the provision without
amendment, the authorization of volunteers triggered a heated—and
heavily partisan—constitutional controversy. Democratic-Republicans
in the House attacked the provision on two constitutional grounds: first,
the provision violated the requirement that militia officers be appointed
by the states, and second, the law authorized the president to call forth
these volunteer forces outside of the purposes enumerated in the Militia
Clauses.366 If the volunteers constituted “militia,” then the Republicans
correctly protested the provision. But if the volunteers were part of the
army, then the Constitution vested the appointment in the president,
who could command them outside the purposes enumerated in the
361. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948)).
362. On the debate in Congress, see 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 248–50.
363. An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a Provisional Army, ch. 47,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 558, 558 (1798).
364. § 3, 1 Stat. at 558 (authorizing and regulating volunteers).
365. § 3, 1 Stat. at 558.
366. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1740 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1798) (statement of Rep.
McDowell) (noting that the volunteers would not be constrained by the three purposes of calling
forth the militia); id. at 1704 (statement of Rep. Sumter) (arguing that the provision violated the
Militia Officer Clause); id. at 1703 (same).
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Militia Clauses. The critical question, then, was whether these
volunteers were constitutionally part of the “army” or the “militia.”
The Federalists argued that the volunteers constituted part of
the army. Two arguments emerged in favor of this view.
Representatives Samuel Dana, Robert Harper, and Harrison Gray Otis
argued that the voluntariness of service marked the dividing line
between a militiaman and a regular soldier: members of the militia
were conscripted into service, whereas members of the army
volunteered.367 Here, the volunteers were not conscripted; they offered
their services for a limited time, just like a regular enlistment contract.
The only difference was that the volunteers’ service was more limited
than the service of full-time soldiers, but this difference in amount of
service did not trigger a difference in kind about whether these
individuals still constituted army troops.368 Representatives Samuel
Sitgreaves and Robert Harper argued that because the volunteers were
not subject to the limitations of the militia (e.g., they could be used for
purposes beyond those authorized by the Militia Clauses), they were
raised pursuant to the Army Power.369
The Democratic-Republicans, in contrast, asserted that the
proper dividing line was in the nature of the service. Militiamen served
part-time, whereas regular soldiers served full-time. Representative
Joseph McDowell claimed that “[h]e knew only of two descriptions of
soldiers, regulars and militia”370 and “these men could not be considered
any other than militia, until they were enlisted into the service of the
United States.”371
Other Democratic-Republicans took a more nuanced view of the
situation. Representative Nathaniel Macon referred to the volunteers
as a “mongrel kind of army” and challenged the Federalists to find the
constitutional authority to create such a hybrid force.372 Albert Gallatin
likewise thought that the proposed force straddled the line between
army and militia. Several factors suggested classification as army. The
men signed up voluntarily by enlistment, they had their officers
appointed directly by the president, and, if summoned, they could be
required to serve the full two years—whereas the 1792 and 1795 Militia
Acts required militia to be rotated after serving three months on active

367. Id. at 1704, 1705, 1733.
368. Id. at 1705–06 (statement of Rep. Harper) (arguing that the volunteers were creating a
contract with the United States to serve in the army and follow its regulations).
369. Id. at 1705–06, 1730, 1765.
370. Id. at 1737.
371. Id. at 1705 (statement of Rep. McDowell).
372. Id. at 1756 (statement of Rep. Macon).
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duty.373 But like the militia, until called into actual service, volunteers
remained as civilians with no army pay, and were subject neither to the
rules governing the army nor the Articles of War.374 The problem for
Gallatin was that the Constitution only recognized two categories of
soldiers—“army” and “militia”—and these were halfway between both.
Gallatin feared that, if allowed to proceed, Congress could evade the
restrictions on the militia by turning the militia into a standing army.375
Congress kept the provision for volunteers by a 56-37 vote.376
The vote itself created some controversy, as at least one DemocraticRepublican claimed he had voted in favor of keeping the provision on
the condition that Congress would subsequently amend it to comply
with the Militia Officer Clause.377 But Congress refused to amend it,
and the provision was adopted. Ultimately, while many volunteer
companies offered themselves for service, only one was used to assist in
suppressing Fries’s Rebellion.378
On the merits, the Democratic-Republicans had the better
argument. Neither proposed line offered by the Federalists to
distinguish army troops from militia had any sound historical basis.
Representative Sitgreaves’s army/militia distinction fails for the same
reason that the present-day National Guard system has constitutional
difficulties: it confuses limitations with constitutive conditions.379 Nor
does the Dana-Harper-Otis conscription/volunteer line properly
demarcate the army/militia distinction. This line belied a history of
impressment and attempted conscription. When Britain needed to fill
army quotas to fight in foreign wars, the Crown occasionally issued
commissions of array authorizing impressment.380 Moreover,
Parliament had proposed conscription bills in 1704 and 1707,381 George
Washington requested a draft during the Revolution,382 and Madison

373. Id. at 1725–26 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
374. Id. at 1725.
375. See id. at 1726 (“If the principle proposed to be adopted in this section be admitted, the
consequence may be that all the regulations provided in the Constitution for securing a good militia
may be evaded, and the whole of the militia be turned into a kind of Public Standing Army.”).
376. Id. at 1758.
377. See id. at 1759–60 (statement of Rep. McDowell) (arguing that further consideration of
the volunteer provision was necessary to address whether or not the president should appoint the
officers commanding the volunteers).
378. 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 250 n.102.
379. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between limitations
and constitutive conditions).
380. See supra notes 339–344 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
382. See Letter from George Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army, in 10
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 42, at 362, 366.
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proposed conscription during the War of 1812.383 Parliament’s and
Madison’s bills were attacked as being unconstitutional, and in
Section III.A, I argued that conscription into the regular army presents
a structural constitutional problem. The Dana-Harper-Otis argument,
however, is conceptual. They claimed that an “army” consists of
“voluntarily enlisted soldiers” by definition. But this is wrong. Although
voluntary enlistment was the customary way of raising soldiers,
England and the United States knew of other ways, even if those ways
were viewed as being illegitimate or illegal. Conscription does not
convert an “army” into a “militia.”384
Conversely, both England and the United States long had
volunteer militia units. “Trained bands” began appearing in England in
the sixteenth century.385 Volunteer militia also appeared in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were widely known by the
Framers.386 Pennsylvania initially only used volunteers for the militia
because the colony had a large population of Quakers.387 Thus, the
Dana-Harper-Otis argument is wrong on both counts: not only did
“armies” sometimes have soldiers forced to serve, but militia units
frequently had volunteers.
As understood at the Framing, what distinguished armies from
the militia was that armies had full-time troops while the militia had
part-time troops. Consequently, the Democratic-Republicans were right
to object to the proposed volunteer force as sanctioning an
unconstitutional federal select militia.388
383. See supra notes 290, 312 and accompanying text.
384. And if a militia were, by definition, a conscripted land force, then that would be fatal for
the constitutionality of conscription into the U.S. Army.
385. See BARNETT, supra note 29, at 34; MALCOLM, supra note 34, at 4.
386. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 160, at 2; CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 2
(describing that the American colonies generally relied on volunteers while leaving the general
militia “exempt from the militia call except under the most dire circumstances”); James Biser
Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1992)
(“Volunteers were formed in militia units who came under the command of professional, usually
British, officers and served in regular military units.”); see also WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 8
(same).
387. See WEIGLEY, supra note 41, at 7–8.
388. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D at 274–75 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803):
As these select corps were not called into actual service by those acts, but were only
liable to be called upon at the pleasure of the president, it seems impossible to view
them in any other light, than as a part of the militia of the states, separated by an
unconstitutional act of congress, from the rest, for the purpose of giving to the president
powers, which the constitution expressly denied him, and an influence the most
dangerous that can be conceived, to the peace, liberty, and happiness of the United
States.
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That the House of Representatives, in a largely partisan action,
approved volunteer army units in the heat of an undeclared war with
France should not serve to liquidate the meaning of this constitutional
provision.389 As with the Sedition Act,390 which was passed a few weeks
later, Congress’s actions were highly partisan, with the Federalists in
favor of the constitutionality of the volunteers and the DemocraticRepublicans opposed. The Federalists were frustrated with the
Democratic-Republicans’ refusal to provide for any meaningful defense,
whether by army, navy, or a properly disciplined militia.391 And the
quasi-war with France exacerbated this frustration since they felt that
the United States was vulnerable to invasion.392 So the Federalists were
especially motivated to resolve constitutional questions in favor of
federal power.393
Nor did any settled practice emerge; later Congresses reversed
themselves several times on whether the volunteers were part of the
army or militia. In 1807, Congress passed legislation again authorizing
volunteers, but this time the Democratic-Republicans, who now
controlled Congress, required state appointment of officers.394 Because
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution requires federal appointment of
federal officers, this action was only proper if the volunteers were
militia, not army.395 But during the War of 1812, Madison requested—
and Congress granted—authority for the president to again appoint the
officers, an action only proper if the volunteers were part of the army.396
389. On James Madison’s theory of constitutional liquidation, see William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). Madison argued that an indeterminate
constitutional provision could become liquidated through a course of practice that was deliberate
when that course of practice resulted in a meaning of the provision that was accepted by the public
and acquiesced to by those holding dissenting views. See id. at 13–21.
390. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
391. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851) (1798) (statement of Rep.
Sitgreaves) (expressing frustration with the Democratic-Republicans’ “[un]willing[ness] to pay for
a navy, nor an army, nor to trust the defence of the country to its own citizens”).
392. Id. at 1734–35 (statement of Rep. Otis).
393. On the other hand, the Federalists did not dispense with all constitutional niceties. A bill
authorizing the president to “call[ ] out 20,000 militia, at a time to be trained and disciplined” was
defeated with only eleven votes in favor of it. Id. at 1701–02. Members referred to the Militia
Clauses, which explicitly reserved training to the states. Id.
394. An Act Authorizing the President of the United States to Accept the Service of a Number
of Volunteer Companies, Not Exceeding Thirty Thousand Men, ch. 15, § 2 Stat. 419, 419–20 (1807).
Strangely, given the Democratic-Republicans’ constitutional objections, the Act grandfathered in
companies whose officers were appointed by the president. Moreover, the Act failed to limit the
federalization of the volunteers to only those purposes allowed by the Militia Clauses, although
the House sponsor provided assurances that the volunteers would only be used in case of
insurrection or invasion. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 167–72.
395. 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 167.
396. An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled “An Act Authorizing the President of the
United States to Accept and Organize Certain Volunteer Military Corps,” ch. 138, 2 Stat. 785
(1812). James Madison’s support for federal appointment of officers might give credence to the
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And during the Civil War, in a law reminiscent of Madison’s failed
militia proposal,397 Congress authorized the president to commission
generals in the volunteers, while leaving to the states the appointment
of field, staff, and company officers.398 The services provided by the Civil
War volunteers, moreover, were primarily militia in character—“for the
purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, enforcing the
laws, and preserving and protecting public property.”399 Thus, it is
difficult to draw any conclusions from the congressional precedent,
except to say that Congress, as an institution, had been undecided on
this question and had often faced the issue during difficult wartime
circumstances.400
Nevertheless, Congress’s struggle to separate “militia” and
“army” leaves no doubt about the illegitimacy of conscription for the
reserves. The Federalists, in arguing for the legitimacy of the
“volunteers,” argued that the difference between a militiaman and an
army soldier was that the militiaman was a conscript while the soldier
was a volunteer.401 The Democratic-Republicans countered (correctly, I
believe) that the distinction between the two forces was whether they
were part-time (militia) or full-time (army).402 Regardless of which side
was correct, it is clear that conscription in the army reserve would not
be allowed. Either their conscription or their part-time status would
make conscripted reservists members of the “militia.”403

view that the volunteers were army. But one must remember that Madison was highly partisan
on this issue. Although a Democratic-Republican in 1812, Madison had been a staunch opponent
of any state control over the army or militia since his days as a delegate at the Constitutional
Convention. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
398. An Act to Authorize the Employment of Volunteers to Aid in Enforcing the Laws and
Protecting Public Property, ch. 9, 12 Stat. 268 (1861). The law allowed the president to commission
lower-ranking officers if states failed to make the appointment. § 4, 12 Stat. at 269. My thanks to
Zachary Price for pointing this out.
399. § 1, 12 Stat. at 268.
400. During the Civil War, courts drew different dividing lines between armies and militia.
The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the voluntary enlistment/conscription line. See Kerr v.
Jones, 19 Ind. 351, 354 (1862) (“The army is raised by voluntary enlistments. The militia is called
forth.”). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals used the full-time/part-time distinction when
deciding the legality of conscription under the Confederate Constitution. See Burroughs v. Peyton,
57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470, 475 (1864) (“An army is a body of men whose business is war: the militia a
body of men composed of citizens occupied ordinarily in the pursuits of civil life, but organized for
discipline and drill, and called into . . . temporary military service when the exigencies of the
country require it.” (emphasis added)).
401. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 370–375 and accompanying text.
403. The creation of the provisional army does raise another question of whether Congress can
maintain an “inactive reserve.” The inactive reserve is basically a pool of individuals who give the
government an option contract—that is, they agree, if called, to enter full-time army service. I
cannot fully answer that question here, but my inclination would be that such an inactive reserve
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Accepting arguendo the legitimacy of the draft into the regular
army, the Supreme Court would have good reasons to hold the line
there. Recognizing the power to draft into the (regular) national army—
while in tension with the limitations of the Militia Clauses—does not
result in their total annihilation. Individuals and state governments
would only lose their protections and reserved powers under the Militia
Clauses when citizens were drafted into the professional forces. But if
the federal government can have a conscripted “U.S. Army Reserve”—
a militia in everything but name—the federal government has little
reason to share control over the militia with the states. The federal
government can just raise the same part-time forces using its Army
Power without the inconvenience of the Militia Clauses’ limitations.
Moreover, recognizing the power to draft only into the regular
army maintains soft-power limitations on the federal government’s
ability to conscript outside the militia system. With a draft, the federal
government is still bound to pay for regular troops. The cost of troops
naturally serves to limit the size of the regular army and
correspondingly diminishes Congress’s enthusiasm for a universal
draft, especially in peacetime. Thus, even conceding the legitimacy of
the draft, Congress should be limited to conscripting soldiers into the
regular army.
*

*

*

This Part has defended two claims. First, though it is a close and
difficult question as an originalist matter, conscription into the national
army is unconstitutional. Second, assuming the constitutionality of
conscription, the federal government is limited to conscripting soldiers
into the regular army. The abrogation of traditional limitations on
federal military power have had a profound and continuing impact on
the balance of military power between the president and Congress,
between the federal government and the states, and between the
federal government and the citizenry—issues to which I now turn.
IV. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES:
WHY MILITARY FEDERALISM STILL MATTERS
This Part explains how the destruction of federalism-based
checks on federal military power affects contemporary constitutional
and political debates. Granting the federal government virtual plenary
would be constitutional provided that (1) the individuals entered full-time army service if called
and (2) the government did not regulate the individuals until they were called to serve.
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authority over the military has helped with military readiness and
political accountability. But the arrogation of power solely in the federal
government presents new constitutional challenges. This Part will
consider the effects of the demise of military federalism on
(1) separation of powers, (2) the federal-state balance, and
(3) Congress’s power to impose military law on reserve and retired
soldiers.
A. Separation of Powers
One fiercely contested topic is the proper demarcation in
responsibility between Congress and the president in authorizing and
levying armed conflict. Since President Truman’s unilateral
commitment of troops to Korea, presidents have asserted increasingly
strong preclusive authority to deploy military forces irrespective of
Congress’s inaction or contrary action.404
Some commentators argue that, except in cases of immediate
self-defense, Congress is supposed to authorize war before the president
can commit troops.405 Others argue that the appropriations and
impeachment powers give Congress the ability to check executive
warmaking, but the president requires no advance congressional
approval before committing troops.406 This second position generally
implies a broad inherent preclusive power of the president as
commander in chief to commit troops and authoritatively determine the
incidents of combat. And a third group does not take a sequential
404. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1057–58 (2008). Barron and Lederman
trace the history and note that presidents before Truman rarely defied Congress openly. Id. at
1055–56. Mostly, they acted in the absence of Congress or, when they defied Congress, did so under
the theory that an emergency existed and Congress would later ratify their actions. Id. The concept
of a true preclusive authority to engage in hostilities in open defiance of Congress began with
President Truman and continues to the present day. Id. at 1098–99.
405. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 5 (1993) (explaining that Congress was granted the power “to
declare war” rather than “to make war” so as to ensure the president possessed tactical control
over military forces and retained the ability to “repel sudden attacks” when necessary); Charles A.
Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675
(1972) (explaining that while an early draft of the Constitution granted Congress the power to
“make” war, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry supported replacing this text with the power
“declare” war, leaving the executive the power to repel sudden attacks); William Van Alstyne,
Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6 (1972) (recounting discourse during the Constitutional Convention on the change).
406. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 295 (1996) (“Contrary to the arguments by
today’s scholars, the Declare War Clause does not add to Congress’ store of war powers at the
expense of the President. Rather, the Clause gives Congress a judicial role in declaring that a state
of war exists between the United States and another nation . . . .”).

Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete)

2020]

FEDERALISM AND THE MILITARY POWER

5/22/2020 6:48 PM

1059

position, but argues for a strong role of Congress throughout the
warmaking process and against an inherent preclusive power in the
president.407
As John Yoo has recognized, this debate creates a role reversal
in constitutional scholars’ politics and theories of constitutional
interpretation.408 Liberals often marshal original constitutional debates
to support their belief against executive power to initiate war.
Conservatives, in contrast, focus on the evolving times, from the prior
precedents of presidents unilaterally commencing wars to arguments
that, in the nuclear age, the president must have significant authority
to act without Congress’s approval.409 Neither camp is monolithic. Yoo’s
article, for example, gives a comprehensive originalist defense for why
the president enjoys significant inherent constitutional authority to
initiate hostilities.410
The destruction of military federalism offers a different kind of
reply to originalist scholars who argue that the president enjoys
significant inherent constitutional authority to initiate war. Military
federalism provided many hard-power and soft-power checks on the
president’s ability to engage U.S. forces unilaterally, especially in
foreign theaters of conflict.411 With respect to formal constitutional
checks, the federal government had limited access to the militia, which
was the nation’s intended military reserve force. The militia could only
be used to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
The Constitution, moreover, grants Congress—not the president—the
power to provide for calling out the militia for these purposes. Congress
could exercise the power directly, as it did before 1792 when Congress
examined President Washington’s request for forces on an individualconflict basis.412 Or Congress could largely delegate this power to the
president, as it did with the 1792 and 1795 Militia Acts and the 1807
Insurrection Act. But even when the power was delegated, the president
was limited to calling on reserve military forces only for domestic law

407. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008)
(arguing that Congress remains intimately involved with the warmaking process, even if the
executive takes the lead on initiating hostilities); cf. Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander
in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008)
(examining the role of Congress during hostilities and arguing that Congress has significant
concurrent power over operations).
408. Yoo, supra note 406, at 172.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 172–75.
411. My thanks to Alex Platt for making this point to me in private discussions.
412. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 406, at 291 (explaining that Congress debated the merits of
various campaigns when President Washington requested more troops and militia).
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enforcement, to suppress an insurrection, or to repel an invasion. Thus,
the president only possessed unilateral control over a small standing
army and navy. These forces were insufficient to allow the president to
unilaterally engage in significant foreign conflicts.
The dramatic increase in today’s standing army and navy gives
the president a greater capacity to engage in foreign conflicts. As of
February 2020, the United States has approximately 1.38 million active
duty personnel.413 These forces allow the president to unilaterally
engage in limited conflicts, such as those in Panama and Kosovo. But
the true backbone of today’s armed forces—what allows the president
to sustain long foreign campaigns or engage unilaterally in total war
with another country—is the U.S. Armed Forces Reserve. The United
States maintains an additional 804,235 in the Selected Reserves (i.e.,
the active, drilling component).414 Of these, approximately 524,000
reservists are in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, and
another approximately 147,000 are in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and
the Air National Guard.415 As I have argued in Part II, these forces are
constitutionally part of the “militia.” This means that today’s large
standing army, comprising regular troops, has not obviated the federal
government’s need to maintain a large organized militia.
By organizing the militia outside of its intended constitutional
limits, the federal government has destroyed many soft-power checks
413. For active duty and reserve numbers, see DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports &
Publications, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
(last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KT5C-RF9E] (compiling statistics). The manpower
statistics cited are from the February 29, 2020 version of the Department of Defense reports. See
Armed Forces Strength Figures for February 29, 2020, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020),
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=ms0_2002.pdf&groupName=milTop
[https://perma.cc/ABN4-Q3VL]; Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade, DEF. MANPOWER
DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=
rg2002.pdf&groupName=milRankGrade [https://perma.cc/E4MC-WPJR]. The figure includes the
total manpower of all Armed Forces components, including the Coast Guard. For the maximum
authorized strength for active duty, permanent active force, and Selected Reserves, see John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §§ 401, 411,
412, 132 Stat. 1636, 1734–1736.
414. Selected Reserves by Rank/Grade, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Feb. 29, 2020),
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=DRS_42486_SelRes_202002.pdf&gr
oupName=resRankGrade [https://perma.cc/X2KM-MQFR].
415. See id. Again, these numbers include only the Selected Reserve. For more severe
emergencies, the federal government may call upon an additional 231,000 members of the
Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard. Lawrence Kapp, Defense Primer:
Reserve Forces, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10540.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46MM-2TDG] (statistics as of September 30, 2019). And if the federal
government needs even more manpower, the United States may call up members of the Standby
Reserve, 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (2012), as well as retirees from the active duty and reserve components,
10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012). See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 4-05,
JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING IV-7 (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9PV-XNF8].
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on the president’s capacity to wage war unilaterally. Under the
Constitution as originally understood, the president would have a
difficult time initiating a foreign war. Because the militia was only
available for domestic needs, waging a foreign war of any substance
required the president to request from Congress an increase in the
authorized strength of the professional services. Thus, the original
constitutional system forced early presidential-congressional
consultation. Today, in contrast, the president can call up substantial
reserves without first consulting Congress about the need for more
personnel.416 And even if the president managed to convince Congress,
he still would have to convince the potential future troops themselves.
The accepted mode of raising regular troops was by enlistment—not
conscription—so the federal government would have to entice sufficient
soldiers to enlist for the war. Unpopular wars would likely command
higher enlistment bounties, which would serve as an economic
disincentive to initiate conflicts.
One might argue, as David Barron and Martin Lederman do,
that extensive presidential-congressional consultations still take
place.417 Although the president might be able to call up the reserves
and initiate a conflict, he could not sustain the conflict without
congressional support. The need for increased appropriations to fight a
war inevitably leads the president to coordinate with Congress. Indeed,
for some like Yoo, the Appropriations Power is the core of Congress’s
check on the president’s ability to wage war.418 Yoo argues that
a failure of political will should not be confused with a constitutional defect. A
congressional decision not to exercise its constitutional prerogatives does not translate
into an executive branch violation of the Constitution. Certainly congressional timidity
cannot justify rearranging the Constitution—either to restrict the President’s warmaking powers, or to push the federal courts into political question cases—without a
constitutional amendment.419

But as a matter of political reality, relying solely on the
Appropriations Power shifts the balance of power heavily toward the
executive. Because the president would have to convince Congress to
416. 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (2012) (Ready Reserve). The president, however, generally needs a
congressional declaration of war or national emergency to call up members of the Standby and
Retired Reserve. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a).
417. See supra notes 404, 407, and accompanying text.
418. See Yoo, supra note 406, at 295 (“Although the Constitution gives the President the
initiative in war by virtue of his powers over foreign relations and the military, it also forces the
President to seek money and support from Congress at every turn.”). Of course, another soft-power
limitation on the federal government’s ability to wage war was the limited taxing power of the
original Constitution. Initiating war often required Congress to authorize borrowing. Today, in
contrast, expanded revenue sources allow the president to initiate conflicts and only later go back
to Congress to continue the funding. My thanks to Ian Ayres for raising this taxation point.
419. Id. at 299.

Leider_Galleyed (Do Not Delete)

1062

5/22/2020 6:48 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4:989

raise the necessary troops, the original constitutional system required
close consultation before the president could initiate significant
hostilities. Now, the system only requires consultation to continue
combat that the executive can unilaterally start. Politically, the
president has an easier time requesting extra funds when American
troops are already fighting in harm’s way than he does convincing
Congress to raise the necessary troops to begin the conflict.420 Thus, Yoo
does not account for the fact that “congressional timidity” is an
unintended byproduct of destroying constitutional limits on federal
military power.421 The destruction of military federalism is likely a
substantial factor in Congress’s abdication of its role to deliberate and
authorize wars.
Because the destruction of federalism in military affairs has
altered the separation-of-powers dynamic between Congress and the
president, evaluating the constitutionality of congressional efforts to
rebalance that power inherently involves “second-best” constitutional
interpretation. For example, assume arguendo that the War Powers Act
is unconstitutional as an original matter. This does not tell us whether
we should recalibrate the system because the destruction of military
federalism has given the president more power to initiate war than the
Constitution originally intended. In this light, we might view the Act as
a necessary legal restraint on the president’s enhanced warmaking
ability. Given that the federal government is already operating outside
of its intended constitutional limits in military affairs, the real question
we should be asking is: How do we redivide the military power that the
federal government seized from the states among the legislative and
executive branches? For originalists, these questions involve answering
whether second-best doctrines should be employed to compensate for
the failure to follow the original structure.
The destruction of military federalism also means that state
political leaders have less influence on the president’s use of military
reserves. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen has explained, cooperative
federalism causes the states to act as a check on broad executive
discretion.422 Under the constitutional militia system, state political
leaders, to whom the militia were principally attached, could be

420. See, e.g., id. at 298 (noting, in the context of the war in Bosnia, that “the House passed a
resolution opposing President Clinton’s policy, but supporting the troops”).
421. Id. at 298–99.
422. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 491 (2012) (“[B]y giving two different actors some role in a statutory
scheme . . . Congress bakes competition into the scheme. Each agent has the incentive and ability
to monitor the other, and, when they disagree, to claim that it is the superior agent of Congress.”).
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expected to advocate on the militia’s behalf.423 The political dialogue
involved in calling forth the militia—and the militia’s resistance to such
inconvenience except when necessary for defense of the country—would
serve to curb the president’s ability to employ military force without
popular support. Except when in active service, militia leaders would
not be under the president’s chain of command, which would insulate
them if they provided candid commentary about the burdens of national
deployment. When the president exceeded his authority or abused his
discretion, state leaders could appeal to Congress to curb that discretion
since Congress had ultimate control over calling forth the militia. The
original constitutional system diffused executive power over the
military between the president and the states, and that division
reinforced Congress’s primacy in military affairs.
Military federalism thus placed significant hard- and soft-power
safeguards against the exercise of the president’s Commander-in-Chief
Power. The destruction of military federalism has created a power
vacuum, which has largely been filled by expanding unilateral
presidential authority. Future debates over the proper demarcation of
warmaking authority between Congress and the president must
account for the changed federal-state balance in military affairs.
B. Federalism
The destruction of military federalism has had some salutary
effects. While the breakdown in military federalism has contributed to
Congress’s decline in deliberating and authorizing military conflicts,
limiting state power over the militia has enhanced Congress’s role in
supervising the readiness of the armed forces and militia. Madison’s
desire for fully nationalized armed forces has been realized. For the
military, the result has been largely positive: better prepared and
equipped armed forces and the prevention of dangerous inefficiencies in
the constitutional military regime.
Nevertheless, the destruction of military federalism has had
profound implications for the federal-state balance of power. States now
have little power over military affairs, including over their state’s
423. This is not to say that state governments would have a veto—only that state officers would
lobby in favor of the militia if the burdens placed on the militia were too great. As Madison noted
during the Virginia ratifying convention, “[i]f you put it in the power of the State Governments to
refuse the militia, by requiring their consent, you destroy the General Government, and sacrifice
particular States.” Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), supra note 41, at 1272,
1274; see also Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 354–55 (1990) (rejecting the constitutional
necessity of a training veto for National Guardsmen sent abroad); cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19, 28 (1827) (holding that the president has sole and unreviewable authority to determine
the exigency when calling forth the militia pursuant to an act of Congress).
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militia. In times of war, this creates difficult problems for state leaders
because they often lack access to military forces sometimes necessary
to meet domestic needs. The militia’s hybrid federal-state status
provides a great case study of many contemporary federalism disputes.
1. Political Accountability
One major theme undergirding the rise of contemporary judicial
federalism is the need to ensure political accountability.424 In United
States v. Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that “citizens must have some
means of knowing which of the two governments to hold accountable for
the failure to perform a given function.”425 Without knowing which
leaders to hold responsible, citizens might hold neither accountable,
thereby leading to a failure of political responsibility. Likewise, the
Supreme Court in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States
justified the anticommandeering principle of state legislatures and
executive officers on the grounds that Congress could insulate itself
from unpopular political choices by forcing the states to shoulder
them.426
The history of the militia system lends credence to Justice
Kennedy’s political accountability argument. The Militia Act of 1792
provided guidance on organizing and arming the militia. But Congress
left many of the controversial details—such as compulsory training—to
the states because Congress could not reach agreement on these
issues.427 Despite repeated exhortations from federal political leaders to
correct the problem, neither federal nor state governments took
ownership.428 And a substantial reason why is that neither the federal
government nor the states wanted to pay for the militia. The 1792
Militia Act did not appropriate any money for the militia; Congress
refused to spend the $400,000 necessary to train and equip it.429 Since
424. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 360 (2003) (“If one sovereign is permitted to obscure its role in
bringing about undesirable regulatory outcomes, or if political responsibility is otherwise veiled to
such an extent that the people cannot accurately allocate blame and praise between the two
governments, then the competition’s chief purpose has been thwarted.”).
425. 514 U.S. 549, 576–77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
426. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (state and local officers); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (state legislatures).
427. See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS,
OR HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 113 (2002) (“Congress simply laid out the
organizational form of the nation’s militia, dividing the force into divisions and battalions that
were in turn subdivided into regiments and companies . . . and left to the states the problem of
compelling citizens to fill out these units.”).
428. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at 170; UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 427, at 115 &
n.29.
429. CURRIE & CROSSLAND, supra note 163, at 6.
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the federal government maintained a small army, the Act effectively
left the states funding national defense. An 1803 congressional act
required the states to provide militiamen with weapons, ammunition,
and equipment.430 But Congress provided no funding, so the states
largely ignored this mandate.431 The original militia structure thus
permitted the federal government to divorce the laudable goal (i.e.,
maintaining a militia over a standing army) from the politically
unpopular necessary incidents (i.e., paying for the militia and
compelling citizens to train), which led to dysfunction.
The situation only improved after the federal government
effectively took control of the militia from the states with the Dick Act.
Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds on the National
Guard’s compliance with federal standards. The Dick Act required
National Guard units to attend twenty-four drills per year and to meet
the standards of the regular army, in addition to subjecting National
Guard units to inspections by regular army officers.432 As the federal
government became the near-exclusive source of funds and equipment
for the organized militia, the federal government concomitantly
assumed control over the militia’s supervision.
Today, responsibility for the National Guard’s mission falls
largely with the president and federal leaders. The public recognizes
this fact.433 And while not in keeping with original constitutional
design, centralization of power has laudably created political
accountability—federal leaders know that they are now responsible for
the military’s functioning. As a result, the National Guard is better
trained and equipped than the nineteenth-century militia.
2. Overseas Deployment and Domestic Security
While transferring military authority entirely to the federal
government has had beneficial effects on military readiness, the
destruction of military federalism has had some negative consequences
on the federal-state balance. The greatest disadvantage is the
unavailability of state forces during foreign wars.

430. An Act in Addition to an Act, Entitled “An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National
Defense, by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States,” ch. 15, § 2, 2 Stat.
207, 207 (1803).
431. See 1 CURRIE, supra note 231, at 7 n.26.
432. Militia Act of 1903 (Dick Act), ch. 196, § 18, 32 Stat. 775 (1903).
433. Following Hurricane Katrina, for example, President George W. Bush—not state political
leaders—took the brunt of the blame for the inadequate response to the disaster. See Eric Lipton,
Republicans’ Report on Katrina Assails Administration Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/politics/13katrina.html [https://perma.cc/JP2E-CXTK].
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The Constitution authorizes the federal government to
federalize the militia only to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions. Outside these circumstances, the militia remains
under the command of the states. The delegates steadfastly refused
Madison’s attempts to nationalize the militia entirely. A number of
reasons were given for allowing the states to retain some control. Some
feared that having no available military force would doom the states to
insignificance and obliterate the states’ limited sovereignty.434 Others
gave practical arguments: states sometimes needed military forces to
enforce their laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions before
federal authority could be summoned.435
In recent times, states frequently have found their organized
militia called into foreign wars under the Army Power. Many National
Guardsmen have performed at least one tour of duty in Iraq or
Afghanistan. These foreign deployments can interfere with the
National Guard’s ability to perform state functions back home.436 The
potential for National Guard deployments has caused many states to
maintain their own military organizations, called “state guards” or
“state defense forces.”437 These state organizations sit outside the
national militia system, but Congress has consented to their
existence.438
State defense forces have a murkier status than the militia.
Many states consider state guards or state defense forces to be part of
their organized militia.439 Federal law, however, does not recognize
them as such.440 The federal government, moreover, does not provide
for their organization, arming, or discipline. And state defense forces
may not be “called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.”441

434. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 73, 93 and accompanying text.
436. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1) (2012) (relieving National Guard members called to active
duty in the “National Guard of the United States” from their state militia duties).
437. See Arthur N. Tulak, Robert W. Kraft & Don Silbaugh, State Defense Forces and
Homeland Security, 33 PARAMETERS 132, 132 (2003–2004), https://sgaus.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/10/State-Defense-Force-and-Homeland-Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4SG-8FMV].
438. See 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (authorizing such forces).
439. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-3 (2020) (stating that the organized militia of the state
includes the state guard); ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.030 (2020) (same); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 120
(West 2020) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 121-1, 122A-2 (2018) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-2,
20-5-1 (2019) (same); N.Y MIL. LAW § 44 (McKinney 2020) (same).
440. See 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(1) (2012). Federal law may nevertheless imply their existence as
organized militias. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2012) (defining “Army National Guard” as a subset
of the state’s organized militia). But see 10 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (defining “organized militia” to
include only the National Guard and naval militia).
441. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c). Additionally, state defense force members may not be members of any
U.S. Armed Forces reserve component. 32 U.S.C. § 109(e). Although state defense forces may not
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Whether this last provision bans their federalization entirely, including
for the purposes of the Militia Clauses, or simply prohibits their
conscription into the federal professional services (i.e., in the same
manner that National Guardsmen are part of the federal army reserve)
remains an open question.442 In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested
that state defense forces might be subject to federal militia duty
pursuant to the federal government’s statutory power to call forth the
entire militia, including the unorganized militia.443
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has relied on the
existence of state defense forces to justify the federal government’s
domination of the National Guard system. Because federal law
authorizes states to have defense forces, the Court concluded that the
ability of the federal government to call forth a state’s entire National
Guard for any reason (in their status as Army Reservists) is not
constitutionally problematic.444 The Court stated, “As long as that
provision remains in effect, there is no basis for an argument that the
federal statutory scheme deprives Minnesota of any constitutional
entitlement to a separate militia of its own.”445
The courts have never answered what entitlement states have,
if any, to maintain organized militia units independent of federal
authority. Before Heller, lower courts frequently held in gun control
cases that the Second Amendment guaranteed state governments the
right to maintain a militia.446 But in military law cases such as Perpich
and the Selective Draft Law Cases, federal courts steadfastly disclaimed
any preclusive authority of the state to maintain a militia.447 At most,
it seems that a state has a concurrent power to organize additional
militia units based on the Tenth Amendment but no preclusive
power.448

be drafted into the armed forces, state defense force members are not exempt from federal military
duty in their individual capacities. 32 U.S.C. § 109(d).
442. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990).
443. See id.
444. Id. at 350–54.
445. Id. at 352.
446. See, e.g., Silveria v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 622, 628 (2008), that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals,
including those not presently enrolled in a state-organized militia, to possess handguns in their
homes for private self-defense.
447. See, e.g., Heath, supra note 95, at 54, 61–64. Although it is sometimes said that a state
has a right to have a militia, the federal government can conscript every able-bodied person. So
even if states theoretically have a right to have a militia, this right is vacuous because the states
have no preclusive power to have able-bodied persons available for militia service.
448. See discussion supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Regardless of what constitutional entitlement states have to
their own militia units, states lack the money, training, leadership, and
political will to organize these forces.449 Consequently, these state
defense forces are largely unable to replace the National Guard in
providing for domestic security. If anything, the current state of these
forces demonstrates why the Framers were wise not to leave the militia
entirely in state hands.
The Framers intended the militia to be a cooperative federal
institution. Now, two parallel militia systems have developed, one
cooperative and one involving dual federalism. The federal government
uses federal funding conditions to dominate the National Guard and
control it beyond intended constitutional limits. If states want to escape
the Guard system, they must develop state defense forces, which are
largely kept outside of the national military structure. But the Framers
largely disavowed dual federalism in military affairs; the Constitution
intended a uniform militia serving as the backbone of national defense.
The federal government had a large role in providing for the militia’s
organization and training. When the Guard is available—which it
generally is—the states have access to well-trained militia units. But
during prolonged wars or deployments, states risk losing access to
competent military forces to perform state functions.
3. Preventing Illegal State Resistance to Federal Authority
By design, the original constitutional framework provided the
states with the ability to resist federal authority. Madison explained in
Federalist No. 46 that, in the event of a tyrannical exercise of federal
power, the states could band together outside of the federal framework
and resist.450 Hamilton made a similar claim in Federalist No. 28.451
The Constitution facilitated this by reserving substantial authority over
the militia to state governments, including by allowing state
governments to appoint militia officers and by securing to the people
the right to bear arms.
449. See, e.g., James Jay Carafano & Jessica Zuckerman, The 21st-Century Militia: State
Defense Forces and Homeland Security, HERITAGE FOUND. 6–8 (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2474.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6XQ-P36A]
(surveying extant state defense forces and finding them underfunded, with few personnel, and not
much public awareness of their existence or mission).
450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 297–98 (James Madison) (“But ambitious
encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not
excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general
alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause.”).
451. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 24, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he State
governments will . . . afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the
national authority.”).
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There is little doubt that the states often abused their
reservation of military power. During the War of 1812, many states
refused to place their militia under federal command and interfered
with the president’s role as commander in chief.452 Obstructing federal
authority made the militia inadequate for national defense. Even more
prominently, the Southern states unleashed their military power
directly against the federal government during the Civil War.453
The consolidation of military power in the federal government
has largely prevented such illegal state obstructions. State governors
no longer possess the raw power to interfere with national military
objectives, and the courts have supported the federal government when
faced with state interference. The closest modern-day analogue to the
state governor’s refusal of the militia during the War of 1812 was some
governors’ refusals to allow the National Guard to go abroad for
training. The governors objected that the federal government would use
the Guardsmen to undermine foreign governments. In attempting to
block the use of the National Guard, the governors placed their foreign
policy preferences in conflict with the president’s.454 In Perpich v.
Department of Defense, the Supreme Court held that state governors
had no right to veto federal military policy by withholding Guard
units.455
Nor can states effectively combat the federal government
directly. When Governor Orval Faubus used the National Guard to
prevent school integration, President Eisenhower federalized them and
ordered them to report to their armories.456 Because the National
Guard’s allegiance lays primarily with the federal government,
President Eisenhower had no difficulty removing the National Guard
from state command. This gave Governor Faubus no organized military
power at his disposal to resist lawful federal authority.
Commentators often emphasize only the fact that the partial
reservation of the militia to the states enabled the militia to resist the
federal government.457 While the Framers partially designed the militia

452. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
453. Weigley, supra note 35, at 222 (“[T]he Civil War would demonstrate that with their militia
systems, the states retained sufficient sovereignty in a military sense to wage a large-scale war
against the federal government.”).
454. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
455. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
456. Jack
Raymond,
Soldiers
Fly
In,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
1957),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1957/09/25/84766280.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6B2A-EYP5].
457. Amar correctly points out this is not an insurrectionist theory. Instead, the reservation
to the states and the people of the ability to resist the federal government was predicated on the
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system to enable this, the checks on military power were reciprocal. The
Constitution also vested the federal government with the power to
overcome unlawful state resistance to federal authority. The demise of
military federalism has eased the federal government’s ability to
overcome illegal state resistance to federal law.
4. The Militia as the Final Check on Federal Oppression
As a corollary of the last point, the final way in which the
destruction of military federalism matters for the federal-state balance
is that the militia no longer serves as a meaningful check on the federal
army’s use of unlawful force. This function is one of the most widely
touted purposes of military federalism, since the Framing generation
worried about the potential of standing armies to oppress the citizenry.
In contemporary times, however, checking the federal army is likely
military federalism’s least relevant purpose.
Military federalism was largely a concession to moderates and
Antifederalists during the Framing era. Many of the Federalists,
including James Madison, lobbied for fully nationalized armed forces
and militia, not trusting the states to handle defense matters
adequately. For them, there was no need to check the army; separation
of powers and elections provided adequate safeguards against
tyrannical use of the military.458 Indeed, Madison labeled the
Antifederalist argument that these safeguards could fail as
“extravagant.”459
But it is wrong to infer from this fact that having a militia
system as a whole has no contemporary value. Although the militia
system had a remedial purpose (to restore civilian control of
government if political or military leaders failed to respect the rule of
law), its main value was prophylactic: to prevent such a situation from
developing in the first place.460 Today, the militia system retains much
of its prophylactic value. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
“the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian

breakdown of ordinary legal institutions and the rule of law. See Amar, supra note 23, at 1499–
1500.
458. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 24, at 295 (James Madison).
459. Id. at 299.
460. See Amar, supra note 23, at 1500 (“[P]erhaps the strongest evidence of the effectiveness
of the framers’ system of military checks is two centuries of civilian supremacy that have made a
military coup almost unthinkable.”); Weigley, supra note 35, at 215–16 (“Through the early years
of the Republic and throughout the nineteenth century, military forces were too small and too
peripheral to American politics and society at large to be anything but compliant with civilian
control, except possibly during the Civil War.”).
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society.”461 A major fear of the Framers was that regular soldiers, who
live in a separate, highly regulated, and disciplined community, would
not value the freedom that they were tasked with defending since they
did not experience that freedom in their daily life. Whatever their label
(e.g., “reserves” or “National Guard”), part-time citizen-soldiers provide
a forum to keep the military directly connected with the civilian
community. These individuals have nonmilitary occupations and,
except when in actual service, live apart from military discipline.
Nevertheless, they give the government a rapid way of expanding the
nation’s military forces in an emergency, thereby diminishing the
number of regular soldiers needed by the federal government. The
primary purpose of the militia was never to combat the federal
government. Since its earliest days in England, the militia provided
cost-effective defense for the community. Today’s organized militia,
whether called the “U.S. Army Reserve” or the “National Guard,”
continues that tradition.
That said, the destruction of state checks on federal military
power remains significant. The abolition of the remedy of last resort
places more emphasis on other methods of ensuring civilian control of
the military. In a system that lacks state checks over federal power, it
becomes more important to maintain balance in the federal system.
This is done through respecting horizontal structure—that is, by
maintaining separation of powers and having adequate checks and
balances on the executive branch. And it is done by maintaining the
professionalization of military personnel, including keeping the
military politically neutral.462
C. The Limits of Military Criminal Jurisdiction
Because the federal government has collapsed the militia into
the army, a final issue concerns Congress’s power to subject military
reservists to military criminal jurisdiction. The Framers limited
application of military law to the members of the militia only when they
were “in actual service in time of War or public danger.”463 Otherwise,
part-time citizen-soldiers received the same criminal procedure rights
as other citizens. In contrast, the Constitution allows Congress to
subject regular members of the armed forces to military law at all times

461. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
462. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43–64
(2010) (describing the increasing politicization of the military); HUNTINGTON, supra note 27, at
80–97 (discussing how military professionalism can reinforce civilian control).
463. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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based solely on their status as members of the armed forces.464 This
includes cases when the crime has no service connection to the military
other than its commission by a military member. This raises an
important question: Are military reservists to be treated as “militia” or
as professional military for the purposes of military criminal
jurisdiction?
Federal law presently adopts an in-between approach. By
statute, Congress has restricted application of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) to reservists. Generally, reservists are not
subject to military law unless they are on active duty or are training
during inactive duty465—essentially a militia-type approach. But there
are statutory exemptions. For example, the UCMJ applies to retired
regular personnel receiving pay and to retired reservists receiving
hospitalization.466
As a result of this in-between approach, the military occasionally
prosecutes inactive military members for conduct wholly disconnected
from the military.467 For example, in United States v. Larrabee, a retired
Marine Corps sergeant working as the manager of a bar was courtmartialed for sexually assaulting a bartender.468 And in United States
v. Dinger, another retired Marine Corps sergeant faced a court-martial
for possession of child pornography.469 A recent Navy corruption
scandal also put significant numbers of retirees at risk for courtmartial.470
The constitutionality of these prosecutions remains unclear. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has affirmed convictions in
Larrabee and Dinger, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
these cases.471 In contrast, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals struck down a retiree’s prosecution under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment because Congress subjected active
duty retirees to broader military criminal jurisdiction than reserve

464. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 448–50 (1987).
465. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2) (2012).
466. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4)–(5).
467. The Navy Times reports that at least eight retirees have been charged under the UCMJ
by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Army did not report its numbers. Geoff Ziezulewicz,
Court-Martialing Retirees? ‘Fat Leonard’ Cloud Still Looms for Many Current and Former Sailors,
NAVY TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/11/20/courtmartialing-retirees-fat-leonard-cloud-still-looms-over-hundreds/ [https://perma.cc/72YQ-82UW].
468. United States v. Larrabee, No. 201700075, 2017 WL 5712245, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 28, 2017), aff’d, 78 M.J. 107 (C.A.A.F. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019).
469. United States v. Dinger, 77 M.J. 447, 448 (C.A.A.F.), reconsideration denied, 78 M.J. 91
(C.A.A.F. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 492 (2018).
470. See discussion supra note 467.
471. See sources cited supra note 468–469.
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retirees.472 Larrabee has also sought collateral relief from a U.S.
District Court.473
For reservists, the status-based universal jurisdiction outlined
in Solorio v. United States seems inappropriate as the constitutional
ceiling.474 Because the U.S. Army Reserve is a federally organized
militia, military reservists have a strong argument that courts should
apply the criminal procedure guarantees that apply to members of the
militia. The Constitution clearly evidences an intent to exempt parttime soldiers from military law except when in actual service.475 Why
should permitting Congress to maintain a federally organized militia
also allow Congress to subject federal militiamen to military law
outside the jurisdictional restrictions imposed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments? That compounds one constitutional error with another.
As applied to the issues in Larrabee and Dinger, this analysis
suggests two conclusions. First, whether the federal government may
court-martial retirees of a regular component depends on whether
someone who is retired from active service still constitutes part of the
regular forces. I am not sure of the answer to this issue. One answer
might be that retirees are militia because, although they may be
recalled to active duty, their primary occupation no longer consists of
being a soldier. And treating retirees as active duty soldiers creates
tension with fundamental constitutional rights.476 History, however,
may offer a different answer; there is authority for the proposition that
retired members of the military remain in the regular forces despite

472. United States v. Begani, No. 201800082, 2019 WL 3542910, *9–10 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
July 31, 2019).
473. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Collateral Review of Unconstitutional
Trial by Court-Martial) at 9, Larrabee v. McPherson, No. 1:19-cv-00654 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.204940/gov.uscourts.dcd.204940.1.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F86Z-RR66].
474. This argument is premised on accepting that the difference between a member of the
“army” and the “militia” is whether person serves full-time or part-time. For those who believe
that the dividing line between armies and militia is whether the forces are volunteers or
conscripted, my argument against universal jurisdiction would apply to conscripts, mutatis
mutandis.
475. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a . . . crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising . . . in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger.”). Federal statutory law recognizes that members
of the armed forces who are not on active duty may constitute part of the militia. 10 U.S.C.
§ 247(a)(3) (2012).
476. For example, Article 88 of the UCMJ prohibits a commissioned officer from “us[ing]
contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, [and certain other
officials].” 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012). While this Article may be a reasonable disciplinary provision for
active duty forces, this provision raises serious freedom of speech concerns when applied to retired
members who have reentered civilian life and whose chance of serving on active duty again is
almost purely hypothetical.
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their lack of active service.477 Second, contrary to the Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion, there may be a rational basis
to distinguish active duty and reserve retirees. If retirees from regular
components remain in the regular forces, then the narrower
circumstances in which the federal government may subject retired
reservists to military criminal jurisdiction may be compelled by the
Fifth Amendment’s narrower militia exception.478
Regardless of the status of active duty retirees, reserve retirees
are undoubtedly militia. For the reasons explained in Section II.B,
active reservists are militiamen because they are part-time soldiers.
Moving from a drilling reserve member to a member of the retired
reserve does not transform a reservist into a professional soldier. It
moves the reservist in the opposite direction—toward being a full-time
civilian.
Thus, again, we see that the departure from original
constitutional design raises difficult doctrinal questions. In some cases,
a court can only produce originalist judgments by compensating for
previous deviations from original constitutional design. Here, it is
unlikely that federal courts would ever broadly declare the army
reserve in violation of the Militia Clauses. But if a court accepts the
legitimacy of the army reserve while also applying the rule that
Congress can extend plenary military criminal jurisdiction over all
army members (active duty and reserve), then it will reach a result at
odds with the plain text of the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment
allows the federal government to apply military law to part-time
soldiers only in narrow circumstances. Proper recognition of the army
reserve as a constitutional “militia” suggests that courts may need to
narrow the scope of Congress’s power to apply military law to reservists.
Only then would the scope of military criminal jurisdiction remain
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s narrow militia exception.479
More broadly, this suggests that courts need to be careful in how they
approach constitutional construction when engaged in second-best
originalism. Selective usage of originalism can produce judgments
further at odds with the original meaning of the Constitution.

477. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 127, at 87 n.27.
478. I do not mean to defend every particular of Article 2 of the UCMJ. If my argument is
correct, then the provision permitting the federal government to court-martial reservists receiving
hospitalization, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(5) (2012), may be unconstitutional to the extent that it
authorizes such proceedings during peacetime. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
479. Cf. United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 7 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that Senator Lindsay
Graham’s appointment to the Air Force Court of Appeals violated the Incompatibility Clause,
while refusing to rule more broadly on whether a member of Congress’s commission in the military
violated the Clause).
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CONCLUSION
The modern organization of the armed forces heavily deviates
from how the Framers originally divided the military power of the
United States between the federal government, the states, and the
people. The federal government maintains large reserve forces, which
are, in essence, an organized national militia. And through the draft,
the federal government has immediate access to the entire manpower
of the United States, without any role for state governments. In short,
the current system concentrates enormous military power into the
hands of the federal government without the original federalism-based
checks on that power. And the increase of federal power at state expense
has concentrated military power into the hands of the president and
diminished the power of Congress over the armed forces.
But understanding the Framers’ original division is important
to many contemporary debates over how to apply the Constitution to
questions involving the military. With the destruction of federalismbased checks on military power, the only checks and balances are
provided by separation of powers. Understanding this may lead us to
rebalance the division of power between the president and Congress to
compensate for the additional power taken from the states. Moreover,
many questions remain about the constitutional limits of the federal
government to institute a draft and to govern reserve forces. By
understanding the military system’s changes over time, we may be able
to better demarcate an appropriate modern limit to the federal
government’s power to raise and govern military forces.

